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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/22/2007b6
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An individual who is not in the position to testify,
provided the following information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The emails are from BRUCE E. IVINS of
the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID). They are as follows:

On or about January 1, 2007

"(Subject: HaPPY nEW YEAR STYLE - BLESSED BY aMBIEN)

Lots caffeineatee bevereeages -pumped me today. I eel
like I;m flyinh

Hope yuou havea great parttuuy and ;lots of great
convesation, Wehn I start writing thesethings, theyu;re no telling
where they'llscoer I guess i can just wish your fine family a fine
2006. I hoe to hear form ou when you have a cheance"


b6
b7CInvestigation on 03/10/2007 at [REDACTED]File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1702Date dictated N/A

by SA [REDACTED]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, [REDACTED]

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b7C
b7DContinuation of FD-302 of confidential informant, On 03/10/2007, Page 2January 22, 2007

"When I take ambien, I can always tell when it takes effect, because I start to get this quiet euphoria. It hasn't happened yet."

This week IVINS had more mouse challenges and late nights planned. He planned to check new sporulation media (NSM) and sheep blood auger (SBA) spores.

"Now the Postal Service people are all over RIID. They talked to [REDACTED] at the end of the month. What's more is that all of the people above have come back and said the same thing - 'They were asking lots of questions about you.' ('You' meaning me.) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It's very emotionally draining, (...), to know that people think that I could or would be a killer/terrorist. I didn't mail the spores and didn't bioweaponize them, and I hope against hope that nobody took

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID


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Continuation of FD-302 of confidential informant, On 03/10/2007, Page 3

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a strain or some spores that led directly or indirectly to the anthrax mailings.

Now we've added several layers of security, including fingerprint recognition"



On February 21, 2007, SA [redacted] and PI [redacted] met with [redacted] [redacted] U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. [redacted] [redacted], and after reviewing and signing a Non Disclosure Agreement, provided interviewing agents with access to FOIA requests made prior to 9/11 regarding anthrax. [redacted] [redacted]

The information contained in the reviewed files did not generally indicate who had made the request, what information was sought, or the response provided by USAMRIID. A number of files were labeled with the names of primary investigators BRUCE IVINS, [redacted] and [redacted] but contained only copies of those investigators' publications dating back to 1983. [redacted]

Additional files of note contained questions from [redacted]

One reviewed document titled [redacted] [redacted] was located in a file labeled [redacted] and contained information under the headings Date of Item, Type of Item, Originating Office, Subject, and Date Sent for FOIA.

No other items of investigative interest were located in the files provided by [redacted] recommended investigators contact [redacted] the FOIA officer for Fort Detrick to determine if [redacted] had received any FOIA requests related to anthrax that [redacted] was not aware of.

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/10/2007b6
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An individual who is not in the position to testify, provided the following information in the form of emails. In an attempt to protect the identity of the individual, the emails will be summarized by the writer. The emails are from BRUCE E. IVINS of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). They are as follows:

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b7CMarch 21, 2007

IVINS decided his sleep problems will not be remedied by changing his bedtime routine. He believed his problem to be related to his emotional/mental problems. He also mentioned that he has a psychiatrist who allowed medication to sleep.

IVINS talked about federal law enforcement authorities accusing him of being involved in murder and terrorism. He also mentioned that he didn't really care to be "considered as one of the semi-finalists in the 'who are the anthrax terrorists' contest."

March 24, 2007

IVINS discussed his belief that he inherited "the genes for faulty wiring and chemistry in the brain." He hopes that his retirement will take care of the sleep problem, however, he believed the depression medication will stay. IVINS also talked more about his depression and medication.

IVINS stated that he didn't have it in him to be a killer or terrorist, and he would never knowingly play any part in anything that dealt with killing or terrorism. He was also bothered by the possibility that something they made or purified or gave to somebody else, either inside or outside of USAMRIID, could have wound up in the wrong hands.

Investigation on 3/26/2007 at [REDACTED]File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1712Date dictated N/Aby SA [REDACTED]b2
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

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DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 05/03/2007

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On May 1, 2007, [redacted], date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] home telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] residence located at [redacted].

After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] is currently employed at [redacted]. [redacted] has been employed at [redacted] since [redacted]. Prior to employment with [redacted] was employed at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) from [redacted] until [redacted] with USAMRIID [redacted] from [redacted] through [redacted].

While at USAMRIID from [redacted] to [redacted] [redacted] while working in the [redacted] Division. [redacted] worked under [redacted] at that time. Also during this time period, [redacted] worked only in [redacted] during this time. [redacted] attended meetings with people that worked in the [redacted] Division. To the best of [redacted] recollection, [redacted] never went into building [redacted].

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[redacted] was hired by [redacted] for a position in [redacted]. [redacted] assisted in [redacted] within [redacted] laboratory at USAMRIID. [redacted] laboratory within the [redacted] Division was [redacted] laboratory at USAMRIID at the time. [redacted]

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[redacted] was involved with a project, which took

Investigation on 05/01/2007 at [redacted]

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File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1714

Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/01/2007, Page 2

place in building [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]b6
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[REDACTED] recalled that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] also worked with [REDACTED] during these anthrax vaccination studies. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] has never worked with live Ba and has only done work with non-infectious Ba. [REDACTED] has never grown Ba.

When asked about the protocol for assigning numbers to samples at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] stated that a process did not exist for the numbering or labeling of samples at the institute. Each individual investigator was responsible for numbering their samples and the samples from their laboratory were meticulously labeled and documented.

[REDACTED] explained that the reference material receipt (RMR) numbers were used as a system to identify critical reagents. [REDACTED] stated that, with this system, investigators working in the laboratory would know to test a reagent when the lab received a new batch number. This system was used in the [REDACTED] laboratory. [REDACTED] was questioned as to what other individuals [REDACTED] would be familiar with the RMR system used by [REDACTED] laboratory. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] would be familiar with this system.

When questioned about [REDACTED] knowledge of how [REDACTED] samples were numbered, [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] could not advise "how Bacteriology ran their laboratories." [REDACTED] did not have any interaction with labeling or numbering samples in the

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/01/2007, Page 3

[REDACTED] Division. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] never grew or labeled any *Ba* samples.

[REDACTED] was responsible for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

When questioned whether a Quality Assurance Program was in place, [REDACTED] advised the interviewing agents that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] primary responsibility was to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During this time period, [REDACTED] was not producing an anthrax vaccine.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/01/2007, Page 4

[REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] was not involved in any of the [REDACTED] projects, that [REDACTED] recalled. [REDACTED] does not recall BRUCE IVINS ever traveling to [REDACTED]. However, IVINS did perform experiments to assist with the [REDACTED] project.

[REDACTED] did not go to [REDACTED] much, [REDACTED]

When asked whether [REDACTED] remembered attending any meetings in Crystal City, Virginia, [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did not attend any meetings at that location. [REDACTED] may have had an office in Crystal City, Virginia, but, [REDACTED] could not be certain. [REDACTED] advised that the [REDACTED] was responsible for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was questioned about attending [REDACTED] meetings, but [REDACTED] did not remember attending any such meetings.

[REDACTED] advised the interviewing agents that the U.S. Army, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] would hold monthly meetings at [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] attended several of the meetings. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] would also attend the meetings. After leaving USAMRIID, [REDACTED] did not attend any more [REDACTED] meetings in reference to [REDACTED]

While employed at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] does not remember ever going into [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] was vaccinated to go everywhere, but did not go into [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] knew that there was Ba in building 1412. [REDACTED] stated there was not a lot of control over Ba prior to September 11, 2001, and that it was not very "guarded." [REDACTED] stated, however, that there was never any concern or question in [REDACTED] mind that the people [REDACTED] worked with were honest.

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When asked about the personalities of fellow USAMRIID employees, [REDACTED] told the interviewing agents that "scientists are quirky." [REDACTED] stated IVINS is a "quirky" guy. [REDACTED] said that IVINS was always very nice to [REDACTED] and talked a lot about

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/01/2007, Page 5

[REDACTED] added that nobody seemed to be disgruntled. [REDACTED] stated people made the usual "gripes" about the job, but most employees would remain at USAMRIID for a long period of time. [REDACTED] stated not many people left employment at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] does remain in contact with [REDACTED] who has since retired from USAMRIID.

At the conclusion of the interview, [REDACTED] was presented with a Non-disclosure Agreement form which [REDACTED] voluntarily agreed to sign. [REDACTED] reviewed the contents of the form and signed it in the presence of the interviewing agents. Original notes from this interview as well as the Non-disclosure Agreement signed by [REDACTED] on May 01, 2007 will be kept in the FD-340 section of the file, serial 1A 7290.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1715



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DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

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The following investigation was conducted on May 08, 2007, by Special Agent [REDACTED] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation:

As previously reported, [REDACTED] Date of Birth (DOB): [REDACTED], and Social Security Account Number (SSAN): [REDACTED] formerly was employed at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. Per BRUCE IVINS, while employed at USAMRIID [REDACTED] worked on the anthrax vaccine (279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 1417). A query of available keycard access records (08/1998 through 05/2002) for [REDACTED] met with negative results.



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/09/2007

[redacted], Social Security Account Number [redacted] (SSAN): [redacted] Date of Birth (DOB): [redacted] was interviewed, as pre-arranged, at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, on the afternoon of May 04, 2007. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agents (SAs) and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information.

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] was specifically queried as to the security clearance [redacted] held, to which [redacted] responded, [redacted]

As an aside, [redacted] noted USAMRIID did not start working with "Ames" until [redacted]

[redacted] Other strains available at USAMRIID during this period also included: [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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b7CInvestigation on 05/04/2007 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1716Date dictated 05/08/2007by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/04/2007, Page 2

[REDACTED] was specifically queried as to what strains of *Bacillus anthracis* USAMRIID would receive from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] worked in the [REDACTED] division's [REDACTED] suites during [REDACTED] at USAMRIID, circa [REDACTED] through [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] opined [REDACTED] was a very competent [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] of *Bacillus anthracis* while at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] had located [REDACTED] USAMRIID laboratory notebook and provided the same for review.

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The following items of interest were noted by the interviewing SAs pertaining to [REDACTED] USAMRIID laboratory notebook which was entitled:

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 05/04/2007 , Page 3

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(WFO NOTE: [REDACTED] received the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*, also known as 1029, from BRUCE IVINS in [REDACTED]

-the first use of 1029 was on [REDACTED]
"use B. Ivins spore stock 3×10^{10} / mL from
USAMRIID #1029 dilute 1:10 in 1 μ l H₂O heat shock
60 °C 30 min glass tube plate 5 μ l on blood agar
plates (3) incubate at 37 °C"

-the [REDACTED] page of the notebook was dated [REDACTED] and
numbered [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] notebook would be made
available for further review.

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] had no knowledge of any contact
between [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] has never contacted the
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] advised to [REDACTED] knowledge neither [REDACTED]
nor [REDACTED] had any personal or professional contacts in New
Jersey. [REDACTED] further advised [REDACTED] was currently in
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] was residing [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] was familiar with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised to [REDACTED] knowledge no one from USAMRIID
went to [REDACTED] however, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] from
[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/04/2007, Page 4

[REDACTED] came to USAMRIID a few times for meetings. In recent years, the past couple, [REDACTED] has been in contact with [REDACTED]

Enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication is a Non-disclosure Agreement Form, which [REDACTED] voluntarily reviewed and signed as well as a draft copy of the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 05/04/2007b6
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The following evidentiary transport and investigative inquiries were completed by Special Agents (SA's) [redacted] and [redacted] Washington Field Office:

On 05/04/2007, at 07:00am, SA [redacted] transported [redacted] from [redacted] Virginia to [redacted] Maryland, met up with SA [redacted] and continued the transport to the United States Army Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street. [redacted] were returned to USAMRIID [redacted] at 08:15am, at which time an FD-597 was executed by SA [redacted] and signed [redacted]

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At 8:20am, SA's [redacted] and [redacted] reviewed the [redacted] listing the [redacted] to ensure the [redacted] subpoena return GJ 06-01 5429 was all inclusive.

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b7CInvestigation on 05/04/2007 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1717 Date dictated 05/09/2007b6
b7C

by

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 05/04/2007, Page 2

as well as
requested, will be kept in the FD-340 section of the file, Serial
1A-7293.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 05/24/2007b6
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Special Agent (SA) [redacted] contacted [redacted]
[redacted] at [redacted] place of employment, [redacted]
[redacted] telephone number [redacted] who is familiar
with the identity of SA [redacted] provided the following
information.

[redacted] a shipment of the Ames
strain of *Bacillus anthracis* from BRUCE IVINS of the U.S. Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID).
According to the shipping documents, IVINS sent 500 microliters
of *Bacillus anthracis* at a reported concentration of 3×10^9
colony forming units (CFUs) per milliliter (mL). [redacted] recalled
the spores to be contained in a small screw-top vial and that
the spores were shipped on cold packs and not frozen. [redacted]
[redacted] determined the concentration to be 7×10^8 CFU/mL and
[redacted]

[redacted] took the remaining material (approximately 250
microliters), divided it into twenty-five aliquot-parts of 10
microliters each, and stored the aliquot-parts in a freezer.
[redacted]

[redacted] currently has [redacted] tubes
remaining, and will provide them to the FBI.

Investigation on 05/24/2007 at _____ (telephonically)

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1728 Date dictated 05/24/2007

by SA [redacted]
[redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 05/11/2007

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On May 10, 2007, [redacted] SSN [redacted] DOB [redacted] telephone number [redacted], was interviewed by Postal Inspectors [redacted] and [redacted] at Building [redacted] Fort Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] was shown an agent registry created by the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), dated [redacted]. This document is enclosed in a 1A with the original interview notes. [redacted] was asked to comment on Registry entry number [redacted] dated [redacted] which identified [redacted] stated that [redacted] received the agent (Bacillus anthracis) from [redacted] and that [redacted] had obtained it from stock grown by BRUCE IVINS. [redacted]

[redacted] noted that IVINS was listed as the custodian of that agent. [redacted] explained that the registry had been designed to account for the locations where select agents had been present and not as a record of where they are stored. If a researcher used a select agent in a particular room then the date, location, select agent and name of the researcher would be noted in the registry. [redacted] never any flask which contained Dugway material. [redacted] never received or handled the main stock of *Bacillus anthracis*. [redacted] requests for Ba are filled through IVINS and [redacted] receives amounts appropriate for the research project that [redacted] is conducting.

[redacted] stated that [redacted] does not have complete records of Ba transactions with IVINS for the period prior to October 2001. [redacted] further reported that prior to October 2001, [redacted]

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Investigation on 05/11/2007 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-1734 Date dictated 05/11/2007

by PI [redacted]
PI [redacted]b6
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279A-WF-222936

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/11/2007, Page 2

provided as part of the FBI's subpoena request. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was [REDACTED] at the time of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was shown photocopied pages of [REDACTED] entries dated [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] recalled that [REDACTED] was also [REDACTED] working on the [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] discussed the similarities in the [REDACTED] developed from the [REDACTED] material and the [REDACTED] material of IVINS. [REDACTED] further stated that [REDACTED] reported [REDACTED] observations to [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/11/2007, Page 3

[REDACTED] did not discuss these observations with anyone (including IVINS) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] recalled reading an article that described the colonies noted in cultures obtained from the evidence. [REDACTED] does not remember the particular article title, source of the publication or the date. [REDACTED] stated that articles relating to the anthrax attacks and investigation are frequently posted on a bulletin board in the building. [REDACTED] vaguely remembers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] related that [REDACTED] believes that [REDACTED] also believes that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] further stated that [REDACTED] would expect the FBI to investigate [REDACTED] however [REDACTED] related [REDACTED] disapproval for their methods. [REDACTED] further reported that the investigation has especially been hard on "poor BRUCE IVINS".

[REDACTED] was served two Grand Jury subpoenas with instructions to [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 07/20/2007

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To: Counterterrorism
Laboratory

Attn: SSA [redacted]
Attn: UC [redacted] HMRU
SSA [redacted] HMRU
UC, [redacted] CBSU
SSA [redacted] CBSU

Washington Field

Attn: SAC [redacted]
CDC [redacted]
SSA [redacted] CT10
SSA [redacted] CTOC
SA [redacted] HMRT Leader
Attn: SSA [redacted]
HMRT Leader

Baltimore

From: Washington Field
AMERITHRAX-2
Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

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Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) - 1741

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184;
OO:WF.

Synopsis: Law Enforcement Operations Order concerning
environmental sampling of U.S. Army Medical Research Institute
of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort
Detrick, Maryland, commencing on 07/21/2007.

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Enclosure(s): Map of USAMRIID, Building 1425, Suite [redacted]

Details:

Purpose

On 07/21/2007, the Washington Field Office (WFO)
AMERITHRAX squads, with the assistance from the Hazardous
Materials Response Unit (HMRU) and the Hazardous Materials
Response Team (HMRT), will conduct an environmental sampling
search of a [redacted] laboratory suite at
USAMRIID. The [redacted] suite is located in building 1425 and is

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To: Counterterrorism From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 07/20/2007

designated as suite [] The purpose of the search is to collect environmental samples from logical locations within the rooms of the [] suite, where biological organisms may have settled.

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The environmental sampling will be conducted pursuant to consent as provided by []
[] on Thursday, July 19, 2007.

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Background

USAMRIID is a U.S. Army research institute located on the base of Fort Detrick in Frederick, Maryland. Prior to the anthrax attacks in the Fall of 2001, USAMRIID was one of 16 U.S. laboratories which possessed the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* which was used in the attacks. Genetic analyses conducted by the FBI Laboratory and several contract laboratories, has led investigators to conclude that the *Bacillus anthracis* used in the 2001 letter attacks is directly related to RMR-1029. RMR-1029 was a very pure and highly concentrated batch of *Bacillus anthracis* Ames spores, which was produced to conduct numerous anthrax aerosol challenges. RMR-1029 was assembled and stored in a USAMRIID containment suite within Building []

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The *anthracis* spore powder recovered from the anthrax letters addressed to the New York Post and Tom Brokaw contains low levels of a bacterial contaminant identified as a strain of *Bacillus subtilis*. The *Bacillus subtilis* contaminant has not been detected in the anthrax spore powder mailed to either Senators Leahy or Daschle. *Bacillus subtilis* is a non-pathogenic bacterium found ubiquitously in the environment, however, genomic DNA sequencing of the specific isolate of *Bacillus subtilis* discovered within the Post and Brokaw anthrax powders reveals that it is genetically distinct from other known isolates of *Bacillus subtilis*. Analysis of the *Bacillus subtilis* from the Post and Brokaw envelopes revealed that these two isolates are identical.

Analyses to date have not defined the origin of the *Bacillus subtilis* contaminant, in that it could be from a laboratory stock or from the environment. Suite [] is a suite of [] laboratories used to perform experimentation on non-pathogenic organisms to include *Bacillus subtilis*. It is possible that organisms being manipulated within the [] suite may be identified by environmental sampling of the laboratory, to include, but not limited to, the biological safety cabinetry, drain traps, and air handling returns.

b2
b7F

To: Counterterrorism From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 07/20/2007

The [] suite is scheduled to be remodeled starting Monday, July 23, 2007. The occupants of the [] suite have been tasked to have all the equipment and supplies moved out of the suite by close of business on Friday, July 20, 2007, such that renovation can commence on Monday, July 23, 2007. Inasmuch as the AMERITHRAX Task Force prefers more time in planning missions of this sort, the fact that the scheduling for the remodel was only recently discovered, brings about a sense of urgency to this request.

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The environmental samples will be packaged and transferred to the National Bioforensic Analysis Center (NBFAC) where they will be analyzed.

Pre-operation Procedure

All personnel involved with the mission will meet for a safety and operational briefing at the AMERITHRAX Task Force offsite facility in Frederick, Maryland at 7:00 p.m. on Saturday, July 21, 2007.

Operation Execution

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To: Counterterrorism From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 07/20/2007

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT FBIHQ (WMDOU)

For information at the Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Unit.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

LABORATORY

AT QUANTICO, VA (HMRU)

Provide logistical and operational support for environmental sampling of USAMRIID, Building 1425, Suite B5.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

LABORATORY

AT QUANTICO, VA (CBSU)

Provide input and analytical support for environmental sample collection and analysis.

Set Lead 4: (Action)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT HQ CITY (HMRT)

Provide Hazardous Materials Response Team (HMRT) member support for the environmental sampling mission. The AMERITHRAX Task Force has three active members on the Washington Field Office, HMRT that will be involved in the sampling mission, and requests the support of three (3) additional HMRTs.

To: Counterterrorism From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 07/20/2007

Set Lead 5: (Info)

BALTIMORE

AT HQ CITY

For information at Baltimore Division.

♦♦

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS
-1-

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/26/2007b6
b7C

May 01, 2007, [REDACTED] was interviewed at the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] provided the following information:

[REDACTED] was shown a laboratory notebook [REDACTED]
in the year 2001, specifically pages [REDACTED] through [REDACTED] regarding
the [REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED] also commented on various topics concerning
BRUCE E. IVINS. According to [REDACTED] IVINS will bring up old
topics out of the blue, and he will dwell on things. [REDACTED]
described IVINS as being paranoid. [REDACTED] will bring up old times
when he thought people were talking about him.

[REDACTED] believed that this was because he saw change as
a person moving out of his life and he would subsequently be
left out of the new phase in their life. [REDACTED]

Investigation on 05/01/2007 at Washington, D.C.File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-1742Date dictated N/Aby SA [REDACTED]

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b6
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BACK PAGE

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/01/2007, Page 2

[REDACTED] believed that IVINS' relationship to [REDACTED] could be described as [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] IVINS decided to take up alcohol, although he would hide this from [REDACTED]. He also changed his lifestyle from Pro-Life to more middle of the road. According to [REDACTED] other people at USAMRIID also noticed the change.

[REDACTED]

IVINS' social interactions were through work and church. In addition to this, he remained close with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] additionally described IVINS as having a quirky behavior and having issues with his mother and sorority girls.

According to [REDACTED] IVINS doesn't usually make self-priority comments and [REDACTED] didn't recall him feeling left out by not being tasked to do more forensics for the AMERITHRAX case.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 07/10/2007

On July 02, 2007, [redacted] ssan [redacted]
date of birth [redacted] was interviewed in [redacted]
[redacted] provided the following information:

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While working at the U.S. Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), [redacted]
grew up batches of Bacillus anthracis (Ba) spores. [redacted]

-2
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b2
b7F

[redacted] In addition to the hallway freezer, some
Ba stock was stored in the walk-in cold room inside the [redacted]
suite.

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b7C
b2
b7F

[redacted] had a rough area in the cold room where
[redacted] stored [redacted] samples but there were no specific designators
for storing locations for any of the scientists. [redacted]

Investigation on 07/02/2007 at [redacted]

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b7C

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-1743Date dictated N/A

SA [redacted]
by A/SSA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 07/02/2007, Page 2

[REDACTED] did recall the production of a large amount of spores. [REDACTED] the production of spores for that large batch specifically but knew that BRUCE IVINS was. [REDACTED] did not know for whom IVINS was producing the spores or for what project. IVINS did the majority of the dilutions, storage and purification for this large batch.

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SA [REDACTED] showed [REDACTED] color photographs of the "1029 Flask" and the flask labels. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had seen flasks like the one shown and that it was not abnormal to see flasks similar in the cold room; however, [REDACTED] did not recall seeing that specific flask.

[REDACTED] IVINS, [REDACTED] all grew Ba spores. According to [REDACTED] may have grown more than the others simply because [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 07/02/2007, Page 3

[redacted] was shown a copy of a "Reference Material Receipt Record" for 1029. [redacted] had not see that particular form before and had never used it.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/09/2007

To: Washington Field

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

From: Washington Field

AMX-2

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

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b7C

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) 1745

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To provide periodic results of investigation.

Details: Pursuant to the above captioned investigation, Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] AMERITHRAX Squad 2 (AMX-2) reviewed records provided to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) by the Special Immunization Program (SIP) at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) located on Fort Detrick, Maryland. The records contained, in most cases, the name, date of birth (DOB), and Social Security Account Number (SSAN), of USAMRIID employees, or visitors, who were at USAMRIID between the period of 01/01/1998 through 10/30/2001. A thorough review of the provided records noted forty (40) USAMRIID employees/visitors who were issued a SSAN that contained the state series unique to New Jersey.

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By way of background the first three digits of a SSAN are the state series, the following two digits are the group number, and the remaining four digits are the series number. The state series for New Jersey is 135 - 158. Thus individuals who were either born in, or otherwise resided in, at the date of issuance, the State of New Jersey will have SSAN whose first three digits will range between 135 and 158. As such, it is apparent by reviewing records that 40 USAMRIID employees/visitors who worked or otherwise visited USAMRIID between 01/1998 and 10/2001 were born in, or otherwise were issued SSANs unique to, the state of New Jersey. Subsequent investigation attempted to identify if these 40 individuals had a connectivity to the State of New Jersey that warranted further investigation.

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Lexis Nexis reporting on the 40 unique SSANs were obtained and relevant data were queried in the [REDACTED]

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2-20

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/09/2007

[redacted] database for subsequent investigative value. The results are presented in two parts. The first sectioned contains [redacted] database results that relate directly to Major Case 184. The second section contains [redacted] [redacted] database results that do not relate to Major Case 184.

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Section One (I):

The following seventeen (17) current/former USAMRIID employees/visitors have SSANs unique to the State of New Jersey and reporting specific to the above captioned investigation:

[redacted]

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[redacted] Through investigation the following 17 individuals are further described as:

LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

[redacted]

Per Lexis Nexis reporting, no New Jersey address history was noted. [redacted] database query for [redacted] [redacted] met with positive results (279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial [redacted] To date, through investigation and interview, it has been determined, USAMRIID employee, BRUCE IVINS indicated [redacted] worked with the anthrax vaccine for [redacted] years. As previously reported, a query of available USAMRIID keycard access records for [redacted] met with negative results. [redacted] database query for SSAN: [redacted] as well as the [redacted] [redacted] address met with negative results. Unless advised contrary, no further investigation of [redacted] is warranted.


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b7C

LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

[redacted]

b6
b7C

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/09/2007



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b7C

[redacted] database query for [redacted]
and DOB: [redacted] as well as SSAN: [redacted] met with
positive results. Investigation pertaining to [redacted] has, to
date, discovered no evidence or allegation(s) to suggest
[redacted] was involved in, or had knowledge of, the anthrax-laced
letter mailings of 2001 (279A-WF-222936-POI, Serial [redacted]
database queries for the above mentioned New Jersey addresses met
with negative results, with the sole exception of the [redacted]
[redacted] address which was listed as [redacted] current
address in [redacted]. Unless advised contrary, no further
investigation of [redacted] is warranted.

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
LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE INITIAL:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:



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[redacted] database query for [redacted] and DOB:
[redacted] met with negative results. [redacted] database query
for SSAN: [redacted] as well as the [redacted] address
met with positive results. [redacted]

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/09/2007

met with negative results. Unless advised contrary, no further investigation of [] is warranted.

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b7C

LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

[] database query for []
DOB: [] as well as SSAN: [] met with positive results (279A-WF-222936-POI, Serial [] and 279A-WF-222936-302, Serial [] Pursuant to Major Case 184, investigation of [] concluded that [] did not have access to location(s) at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*. To date, no evidence or allegation(s) have been discovered to suggest [] was involved in, or had knowledge of, the anthrax-laced letter [] Unless or until such evidence or allegation(s) are discovered, no further investigation of [] is warranted.

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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
Current Address:

b6
b7C

[] database query for [] and DOB: [] as well as SSAN: [] met with positive results. [] had some professional interactions with [] at USAMRIID; however, there was no evidence or allegation discovered that indicated [] was involved in the anthrax-

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b7C

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/09/2007

laced letter mailings of 2001 (279A-WF-222936, Serial [] and [] database queries for the above mentioned addresses were unremarkable. No further investigation is warranted.

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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

b6
b7C

[] database query for [] and DOB: [] as well as SSAN: [] met with numerous positive results pertaining to [] The Lexis Nexis reporting did not conflict with any information previously developed and reported by AMERITHRAX investigators.

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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE INITIAL:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

b6
b7C

[] database query for [] and DOB: [] as well as SSAN: [] met with positive results. Investigation of [] has, to date, produced no evidence or allegation(s) to suggest [] was involved in, or had knowledge of, the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001. No new items of investigative interest were discovered through Lexis Nexis reporting nor [] reporting. Unless advised contrary, no further investigation pertaining to [] is warranted.

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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

b6
b7C

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/09/2007

[redacted]
[redacted] database query for [redacted] and
DOB: [redacted] as well as SSAN: [redacted] met with positive
results (279A-WF-222936 [redacted] [redacted] database
query for the [redacted] address, as well as the [redacted]
[redacted] address also met with positive results (279A-WF-
222936 [redacted]. A review of the above mentioned serial
indicated [redacted] did not have access to the location(s) at
USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*,
and unless advised contrary, no further investigation of [redacted]
is warranted.

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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

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[redacted] database query for [redacted] and
DOB: [redacted] met with positive results (279A-WF-222936 [redacted]
Serial [redacted] [redacted] database query for SSAN: [redacted]
met with positive results. [redacted]
(279A-WF-222936-302, Serial [redacted]). [redacted] database query for
the [redacted] address met with negative results.
Lexis Nexis reporting as well as [redacted] database results
indicate no discrepancies that would refute information [redacted] had
[redacted] Unless advised contrary, no
further investigation of [redacted] is warranted.

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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
Current Address:

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b7C

[redacted] database query for [redacted] and DOB: [redacted]
[redacted], as well as SSAN: [redacted] met with positive
results (279A-WF-222936 [redacted] Serial [redacted] 279A-WF-222936-
[redacted] Serial [redacted] 279A-WF-222936-302, Serial [redacted] 279A-WF-

b2
b7E
b6
b7C

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/09/2007

222936 [redacted] appropriate.

Serial [redacted]

Information provided for use as deemed

LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
Current Address:

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] database query for [redacted] and DOB:
[redacted] met with negative results. [redacted] database query
for SSAN: [redacted] met with positive results (279A-WF-222936-
USAMRIID, Serial [redacted])

[redacted]

[redacted] database query for the [redacted]
address met with positive results; however Lexis Nexis reporting
indicated [redacted]

[redacted] database
queries for the above mentioned [redacted] addresses met with
negative results. Information already provided to AMX-1
personnel for use as deemed appropriate.

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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:
MISCELLANEOUS:

[redacted]

b6
b7C

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/09/2007

[redacted] database reporting for [redacted] and
SSAN: [redacted] met with positive results. All reporting was
pursuant to the above captioned investigation, and subsequent
follow-up will be handled by writer.

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b7E
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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
Current Address:

MISCELLANEOUS:

[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] database query for [redacted]
address met with negative results. [redacted] database query
for [redacted] and SSAN: [redacted] met with positive results.

b2
b7E
b6
b7C

[redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/09/2007

LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
Current Address:

b6
b7C

[redacted] database query for [redacted] and
DOB: [redacted] as well as SSAN: [redacted] met with positive
results. [redacted] worked in the [redacted] at USAMRIID
and had limited professional interaction with [redacted]
Investigation concluded [redacted] was not involved in anthrax-
laced letter mailings of 2001 (279A-WF-222936-POI, Serial [redacted]
and 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial [redacted]. No further
investigation is warranted as [redacted] and Lexis Nexis reporting did
not refute any statements made by [redacted]

b2
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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
Current Address:

b6
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[redacted] database query for [redacted] and DOB:
[redacted] as well as SSAN: [redacted] met with positive
results. [redacted] was a [redacted] at
Fort Detrick (279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial [redacted] 279A-
WF-222936-302, Serial [redacted] database queries on the
above mentioned address were unremarkable. [redacted] and Lexis Nexis
reporting does not refute anything [redacted] had previously told
the FBI; no further investigation is warranted.

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b7E
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b7C

LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE INITIAL:
DOB:
SSAN:
Current Address:

b6
b7C

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/09/2007

[redacted]
[redacted] database query for [redacted] met with positive results. [redacted] was referenced in the above captioned investigative matter; however reporting, to date, does not indicate [redacted] had access to the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* prior to the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001. [redacted] database query for the [redacted] address also met with positive results; however, no derogatory information was discovered as the same was only referenced in the above captioned investigative matter. [redacted] database for the [redacted] address met with negative results. A query of available USAMRIID keycard access records for [redacted] as well as [redacted] met with positive results; however the records indicated [redacted] did not have any identifiable keycard access at USAMRIID until [redacted]. Furthermore available USAMRIID keycard access records indicated [redacted] has never accessed or attempted to access locations at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*. Information is provided for use as deemed appropriate.

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b7E
b6
b7C

LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

b6
b7C

[redacted] database query for [redacted] and DOB: [redacted] as well as SSAN: [redacted] met with positive results. [redacted] was referenced on numerous occasions pertaining to the above captioned investigation. Investigation pertaining to [redacted] concluded, as, to date, no evidence or allegation(s) were discovered that would suggest [redacted] involvement in, or knowledge of, the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001 (279A-WF-222936-POI, Serial [redacted] database query for the [redacted] address met with negative results. Lexis Nexis reporting and [redacted] database results did not refute any information [redacted] had provided to the FBI in the past.

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b7C

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/09/2007

Section Two (II):

The following twenty-three (23) current/former USAMRIID employees/visitors did not have any [redacted] database reporting referenced in Major Case 184: [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] Through investigation the following 23 individuals are further described as:

LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] database query for [redacted] and DOB: [redacted] as well as [redacted] met with negative results. No New Jersey address history was noted per Lexis Nexis reporting. [redacted] database query for [redacted] and [redacted] met with negative results. Unless advised contrary, no further investigation of [redacted] is warranted.

b2
b7E
b6
b7C

LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] database query for [redacted] as well as SSAN: [redacted] met with negative results. [redacted] database queries for the above mentioned [redacted] and [redacted]

b2
b7E
b6
b7C

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/09/2007

b6
b7C

addresses also met with negative results. Unless advised
contrary, no further investigation of [REDACTED] is warranted.

LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE INITIAL:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] database query for [REDACTED] and DOB:
[REDACTED] as well as SSAN: [REDACTED] met with negative
results. [REDACTED] database queries for the above mentioned [REDACTED]
addresses all met with negative results, with the sole exception
of the [REDACTED] address (referenced on [REDACTED]
in [REDACTED]. However, subsequent investigation
determined [REDACTED] was not residing at the [REDACTED]
address until after [REDACTED] Unless advised contrary, no further
investigation of [REDACTED] is warranted.

b2
b7E
b6
b7C

LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] database query [REDACTED] and
DOB: [REDACTED] met with positive results [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]; however, no derogatory
information was discovered. [REDACTED] database query for SSAN:
[REDACTED] as well as the [REDACTED] address met with
negative results. Per Lexis Nexis reporting, no New Jersey
address history was identifiable. Unless advised contrary, no
further investigation of [REDACTED] is warranted.

b2
b7E
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b7C

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/09/2007

LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

MISCELLANEOUS:



b6
b7C

[redacted] database query for [redacted] and
SSAN: [redacted] met with negative results. [redacted]
database query for the [redacted] address also met with
negative results. No further investigation is warranted.

b2
b7E
b6
b7C

LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

MISCELLANEOUS:



b6
b7C

[redacted] database query for [redacted] and DOB: [redacted]
as well as SSAN: [redacted] met with negative results. [redacted]
database query for the [redacted] address also met
with negative results. Per Lexis Nexis reporting no identifiable
New Jersey address history was discovered. Unless advised
contrary, no further investigation of [redacted] is warranted.

b2
b7E
b6
b7C

LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:



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[redacted] database query for [redacted] and DOB:
[redacted] as well as [redacted] met with negative results.
[redacted] database query for the [redacted] address
also met with negative results. Per Lexis Nexis reporting no
identifiable New Jersey address history was discovered. Unless

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/09/2007

advised contrary, no further investigation of [] is warranted.

LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE INITIAL:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

[Redacted box]

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[] database query for []
and DOB: [] as well as SSAN: [] met with
positive results; however, no derogatory information was
discovered (referenced in []
database query for the [] address met with
negative results. Unless advised contrary, no further
investigation is warranted.

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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
Current Address:

[Redacted box]

[Redacted box]

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[] database query for [] and DOB:
[], as well as SSAN: [] met with negative
results. [] database query for the []
address met with positive results (reference in []
[] however, without additional information it is
uncertain as to the investigative merit of this reference. As it
pertains to Major Case 184, writer opines no further
investigation is warranted.

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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE INITIAL:
DOB:
SSAN:
Current Address:

[Redacted box]

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/09/2007

[redacted]
[redacted] database query for [redacted] and
DOB: [redacted] as well as SSAN: [redacted] met with negative
results. [redacted] database query for the [redacted]
address also met with negative results. No further investigation
is warranted.

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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

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[redacted] database query for [redacted] as
well as [redacted] met with negative results. [redacted]
[redacted] database query for [redacted]
addresses also met with negative results. Unless advised
contrary, no further investigation of [redacted] is warranted.

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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE INITIAL:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

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[redacted] no New Jersey address
history was identifiable. [redacted] database query for [redacted]
[redacted] as well as SSAN: [redacted] met with negative
results. [redacted] database query for the [redacted]
address also met with negative results. Unless advised contrary,
no further investigation of [redacted] is warranted.

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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/09/2007

MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

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database query for [redacted] as well as [redacted]
[redacted] met with negative results. [redacted]
database query for address [redacted] as well as [redacted]
[redacted] met with positive results; however subsequent
investigation indicated [redacted]
[redacted] Unless advised to the contrary, no
further investigation of [redacted] is warranted.

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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
Current Address:

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database query for [redacted] and DOB:
[redacted] met with positive results; however no derogatory
information was discovered [redacted] and [redacted]
[redacted] database query for SSAN: [redacted] as well as the
[redacted] address met with negative results. No further
investigation of [redacted] is warranted.

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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
Current Address:

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database query for [redacted] and
DOB: [redacted] as well as SSAN: [redacted] met with negative
results. [redacted] database query for the above mentioned

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/09/2007

addresses also met with negative results. No further investigation is warranted.

LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

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[redacted] database query for [redacted] and
DOB: [redacted] as well as SSAN: [redacted] met with negative
results. [redacted] database query for the [redacted]
[redacted] address met with positive result; however, no derogatory
information was discovered [redacted]
[redacted] database query for the [redacted] address met
with negative results.

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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE INITIAL:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

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[redacted] database query for [redacted] and DOB:
[redacted] as well as SSAN: [redacted] met with negative
results. [redacted] database query for the [redacted]
address met with positive results; however, it is uncertain at
this time as to if the person referenced as the main subject in
[redacted]
[redacted] database query for the [redacted] address met with
positive results; however, no derogatory information was
discovered [redacted] database
query for the [redacted] address met with negative
results. Unless advised contrary, no further investigation of
[redacted] pertaining to [redacted] is warranted.

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/09/2007

LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE NAME:
DOB:
SSAN:
Current Address:

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[redacted] database query for [redacted] and SSAN:
[redacted] met with negative results. [redacted] database
query for the [redacted] address also met with
negative results. Unless advised contrary, no further
investigation of [redacted] is warranted.

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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE INITIAL:
DOB:
SSAN:
CURRENT ADDRESS:

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b7C

[redacted] database query for [redacted] and DOB:
[redacted] met with negative results. [redacted] database
query for SSAN: [redacted] also met with negative results. [redacted]
[redacted] database queries for the [redacted] address, as
well as the [redacted] address also met with negative
results. Unless advised contrary, no further investigation of
[redacted] is warranted.

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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE INITIAL:
DOB:
SSAN:
Current Address:

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/09/2007



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A query of available USAMRIID key card access records for [redacted] met with positive results; twice on [redacted] in [redacted] in USAMRIID Building [redacted] (no other activity noted). [redacted] database query for [redacted] and DOB: [redacted], as well as SSAN: [redacted] all met with negative results. [redacted] database query for the above mentioned [redacted] address was un remarkable. Nevertheless [redacted]

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[redacted] as such writer opines [redacted] warrants further investigation to determine circumstances of [redacted] activity at USAMRIID, as well as to identify any and all USAMRIID past/current contacts or relationships, if any. Unless advised contrary, writer will handle follow-up.

LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE INITIAL:
DOB:
SSAN:
Current Address:



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[redacted] database query for: SSAN: [redacted] and [redacted] met with positive results; however, reporting solely referenced that [redacted] was employed by [redacted]

[redacted] A query in [redacted] for the [redacted] address, as well as the [redacted] address met with negative results. No further investigation is warranted.

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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE INITIAL:



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b7C

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 08/09/2007

DOB:
SSAN:
Current Address:

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b7C

[redacted] database query for: SSAN: [redacted]
well as, [redacted] met with negative results. [redacted]
database query for the [redacted] address met with negative
results. [redacted] database query for the [redacted]
[redacted] address met with positive results.
[redacted] results indicated in [redacted] the [redacted] address
was referenced in a [redacted] dated
[redacted] however, subsequent investigation has determined
that [redacted] did not reside at the [redacted] address
in [redacted] Unless advised to the contrary, no further
investigation is warranted.

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LAST NAME:
FIRST NAME:
MIDDLE INITIAL:
DOB:
SSAN:
Current Address:

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[redacted] database query for: SSAN: [redacted] as
well as, [redacted] and DOB: [redacted] met with
negative results. [redacted] database query for the [redacted]
[redacted] address, as well as, the [redacted]
[redacted] addressees also met with negative results. [redacted]
database query for the [redacted] address met with
positive results (referenced in [redacted] in a closed [redacted]
however, subsequent investigation indicated [redacted] was did not
reside at the [redacted] address in [redacted] It should be
noted, a query in available USAMRIID keycard access records for
[redacted] met with negative results. Unless advised to the
contrary, no further investigation is warranted.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/13/2007

To: Washington Field

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

From: Washington Field

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

AMX-2/NVRA

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

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Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) - 1752

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b7D

Title: [REDACTED]

AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To document Confidential Human Source (CHS) reporting.

Details: On the morning of [REDACTED] CHS, who is in a position to testify, telephonically contacted, as pre-arranged, Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] AMERITHRAX Squad 2 (AMX-2). CHS provided the following information pertaining to .

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(1-2)

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[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Confidential Human Source (CHS) Reporting Document

Reporting Date: 10/05/2007

Case ID: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) - 1758

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Contact Date: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Type of Contact: Telephonic

Location: Frederick, Maryland

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Written by: Special Agent [REDACTED]

Other(s) Present: N/A

Source Reporting:

CHS, who is not in a position to testify, provided the following information telephonically on the morning of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) employee, [REDACTED] indicated that if USAMRIID is linked to the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001 then USAMRIID will be closed down.

[REDACTED] email invitation sent over the USAMRIID network also poked fun at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
① [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7cALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYSDate of transcription 10/10/2007

[redacted]
[redacted] date of birth, [redacted] social
security number: [redacted] residence address: [redacted]

[redacted] Cellular number [redacted]
Work number: [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of
employment, United States Army Medical Research Institute for
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland 21702.
After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents
and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntary provided the
following information:

[redacted] was employed at USAMRIID from [redacted] through [redacted]
[redacted] was assigned as [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] stated people did piggyback at USAMRIID and that
it happened often. [redacted] said [redacted] could not think of any specific
incident of where a visiting scientist piggybacked with anyone
employed at USAMRIID. [redacted] stated [redacted]

[redacted] does not know anyone associated with the anthrax
mailing.

[redacted] worked with [redacted] worked with
[redacted]

Investigation on 12/15/2004 at USAMRIIDFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1760 Date dictated 06/29/2005by [redacted] Postal Inspector
[redacted] Postal Inspector

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 12/15/2004, Page 2

[REDACTED] worked with Ba and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] gave samples of [REDACTED] to BRUCE IVINS.
[REDACTED] would document these findings in [REDACTED] report. [REDACTED] does
not know where IVINS did his culturing. [REDACTED] was not involve in
culturing techniques.

[REDACTED] has no knowledge of drying Ba.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has used the "hot" areas of room [REDACTED]. He also
worked on [REDACTED] floor. [REDACTED] stated showers are located on the [REDACTED]
floor. Items for disposal were placed in the basement.

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[REDACTED] performed [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] performed these examinations in room [REDACTED] building [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated it would not be difficult to put something
of value in the airlock and have that same person pick that item up
later.

[REDACTED] did not notice complaints out of the norm.

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[REDACTED] did not hear any rumors about getting access to
anthrax.

[REDACTED] does not have family or associates in New Jersey.

[REDACTED] was in [REDACTED]
has never been to New York.

[REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] was responsible for [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that Building [REDACTED] was put out of service
for a while.

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[REDACTED] stated plastic storage containers were not used
but plastic jugs gallon jugs were utilized. [REDACTED] said smaller jugs
contained [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

b6
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 12/15/2004, Page 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] never did any unofficial Ba work. [REDACTED] does not know of anyone who did any unofficial Ba work.

[REDACTED] did not buy pre-stamped envelopes.

[REDACTED] did not personally handle anthrax envelopes and did not do any analytical work with the anthrax evidence.

[REDACTED] said this is the first time [REDACTED] was contacted and interviewed for this case.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] was an [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] worked with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated any study that involved animals came to [REDACTED] division.

[REDACTED] was assigned to building [REDACTED] office [REDACTED] referred to the USAMRIID floor plans and he identified [REDACTED] work locations).

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[REDACTED] left after [REDACTED] had been given an assignment in this area. [REDACTED] did not piggyback after [REDACTED] not see [REDACTED] remove any lab equipment. [REDACTED] had very little contact with [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was not part of anthrax group.

[REDACTED] did not see [REDACTED] work with a lyophilizer.

[REDACTED] never saw [REDACTED] in HOT suite.

[REDACTED] had brief conversations with [REDACTED] but none about anthrax.

[REDACTED] did not socialize with [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 12/15/2004, Page 4

[REDACTED] had not heard anything new about [REDACTED] since the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] assigned to USAMRIID [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] spoke to [REDACTED] in passing about [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] knows [REDACTED] since [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

FOREIGN VISITING SCIENTIST

[REDACTED] did not host any foreign visiting scientist at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] not part of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated most [REDACTED] go into the drug business. For example [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] will email [REDACTED] whereabouts between September 17 - 18, 2001 and October 5 thru 9, 2001.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] is willing to take a polygraph if requested in the future.

[REDACTED] should be re-interviewed.

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/17/2007

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To: Counterterrorism
Laboratory

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]
Attn: UC [REDACTED] HMRU
SSA [REDACTED] HMRU
SPC [REDACTED] HMRU
SPSS [REDACTED] HMRU
UC [REDACTED] CBSU
SSA [REDACTED] CBSU
Attn: SAC Michael J. Heimbach
CDC [REDACTED]
SSA [REDACTED] CT10
SA [REDACTED] HMRT
SA [REDACTED] ERT
SSA [REDACTED] CART
SA [REDACTED] CART
SSA [REDACTED] CTOC
Attn: A/SSA [REDACTED] III
SA [REDACTED] HMRT

Washington Field

Baltimore

From: Washington Field
AMERITHRAX-2
Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

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b7C

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending)

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184;
OO:WF.

ARMED AND DANGEROUS

Synopsis: Operational Plan concerning search of a residence, five vehicles, and work spaces within the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland, commencing on or about October 24, 2007.

Enclosure(s): Two (2) page building schematic. Google Map overview encompassing the three search locations.

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To: Counterterrorism From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/17/2007

Details:

Background

Analysis of the spores used in the Fall 2001 anthrax attacks identified the organisms to be the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*. The anthrax spore powders recovered from the anthrax letters addressed to the New York Post (*Post*) and Tom Brokaw (Brokaw) contain low levels of a non-*anthracis* *Bacillus* contaminant. The non-*anthracis* *Bacillus* contaminant has not been detected in the anthrax spore powders recovered from the envelopes mailed to either Senators Leahy or Daschle.

Originally, the species of the non-*anthracis* *Bacillus* contaminant was incorrectly identified by multiple laboratories, however, upon thorough characterization and genetic sequencing, the contaminant was identified to be a strain of *Bacillus subtilis*. This is a significant factor for the search operations outlined herein. Since *Bacillus* organisms can be misidentified to belong to other *Bacillus* species, the guideline for the collection of cultures consistent with the *Bacillus* contaminant will be to collect non-*anthracis* *Bacillus* cultures.

Bacillus subtilis is a non-pathogenic bacterium found ubiquitously in the environment. However, genomic DNA sequencing of the specific isolate of *Bacillus subtilis* discovered within the *Post* and Brokaw anthrax powders reveals that it is genetically distinct from other known isolates of *Bacillus subtilis*. Analyses of the *Bacillus subtilis* from both the *Post* and the Brokaw envelopes revealed that these two isolates are identical.

USAMRIID is a military research institute located on the Fort Detrick, U.S. Army Post in Frederick, Maryland. Prior to the anthrax attacks in the Fall of 2001, USAMRIID was one of sixteen (16) U.S. laboratories which possessed the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*. Phenotypic and genetic analyses of more than 1,000 Ames samples from the sixteen (16) laboratories has led investigators to conclude that the *Bacillus anthracis* used in the anthrax letter attacks was derived from a sample known as RMR-1029. At the time of its creation, RMR-1029 consisted of a large batch of pure, highly concentrated, *Bacillus anthracis* Ames spores, assembled for the purpose of conducting numerous anthrax aerosol challenges at USAMRIID. RMR-1029 was stored in the B3/B4 containment suite within Building 1425 of USAMRIID under the custody and control of Dr. Bruce Edwards Ivins.

To: Counterterrorism From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/17/2007

The *Bacillus subtilis* contaminant is not detected in RMR-1029 by phenotypic or genetic analyses. It is not known how the *Bacillus subtilis* contaminant came to be in the Post and Brokaw spore powders. Since the contaminant is not found in RMR-1029 and not found in the spore material mailed to Senators Leahy and Daschle, it is reasonable to conclude that the contaminant was introduced during the growth process of the evidentiary material. Taken together, the presence of the *Bacillus subtilis* contaminant, and the phenotypic differences of the evidentiary spore powders, it is presumed that, on two separate occasions, a sample of RMR-1029 was used to grow spores, dried to a powder, packaged in an envelope with a threat letter, and mailed to the victims.

In November of 2006, upon consent provided by USAMRIID Command, strains of *Bacillus subtilis*, were collected from Dr. Ivins's stock collection. All of the collected samples compared negatively to the *Bacillus subtilis* contaminant isolated from the Post and Brokaw envelopes. In June of 2007, upon consent provided by USAMRIID Command, environmental samples were collected from [] space and equipment; but, ultimately compared negatively to the evidentiary *Bacillus subtilis* contaminant.

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Purpose

On or about October 24, 2007, the Washington Field Office (WFO) AMERITHRAX Squads, with assistance from the Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU), the Evidence Response Team (ERT), the Hazardous Materials Response Team (HMRT), and the Computer Analysis Response Team (CART) will conduct searches of the residence of Dr. Ivins, his vehicles, and his work and office spaces within building 1425 of USAMRIID.

The overall purpose of the search is to collect general evidence, to include; digital or electronic media and storage items, notes, envelopes, paper envelope bands, tape, items with pieces of tape, and documents that may be evidence of involvement in the anthrax mailings. In addition, any non-anthraxis species of *Bacillus* isolates potentially located in Dr. Ivins's [] or [] space to include; cold-side change room lockers, [] space, room [] and room [] office space).

Upon the conclusion of the searches for general evidence at each location, HMRT personnel will collect environmental samples from areas that may harbor microbial or genetic signatures of the *Bacillus subtilis* contaminant.

To: Counterterrorism From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/17/2007

USAMRIID

Search areas, which are highlighted on the building schematics (See Enclosure), include; refrigerators and freezers located in Biological Safety Level [] areas of USAMRIID, room [] in the Bacteriology Division of USAMRIID building 1425, lockers located within cold-side change rooms in USAMRIID buildings 1412 and 1425, and [] laboratory suites at USAMRIID.

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The [] suites are located in building [] and are designated suites [] and []. The *Bacillus anthracis* vaccine is the only vaccination requirement for entry into [], however, some of the individual rooms of the suite may have additional protective requirements. HMRT operators will follow the guidance of the on-scene HMRU Safety Officer regarding safety issues and personal protective equipment (PPE). There are [] rooms in the [] suites. These rooms will require further evaluation and additional PPE prior to entry.

The overall purpose of the USAMRIID search is to collect 1) environmental samples, 2) any non-anthraxis species of *Bacillus* isolates potentially located in Dr. Ivins's [] or [] space, 3) digital or electronic media and storage items from Dr. Ivins's space, to include: cold-side change room lockers, [] space, room [] and room [] (office space), and 4) general evidence within USAMRIID, to include; notes, envelopes, paper envelope bands, tape, items with pieces of tape, and documents that may be evidence of involvement in the anthrax mailings.

1) Environmental Samples

All environmental samples will be collected under the guidance of the HMRU Scientist. The collection of all environmental samples, and the search and collection of items from cold-side lockers, [] refrigerators and freezers, and [] spaces will be performed by HMRT personnel.

The largest majority of the environmental samples collected during this mission will be collected from Suite []. The on-scene HMRU Scientist will provide a sampling plan for areas to be sampled. Suggested areas of collection include; Incubators, Centrifuges, Biological Safety Cabinets, Drains, and Return air vents for each room within the suite.

Rooms within the [] suite may have special entry requirements (e.g. animal rooms requiring additional PPE prior

To: Counterterrorism From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/17/2007

to entry). Any special entry requirements, above and beyond the anthrax vaccination, are posted on the door to each room. Prior to entering each room, HMRT personnel must check to see that there are no special entry requirements.

2) Non-anthraxis *Bacillus* species in room []

In November of 2006, non-anthraxis *Bacillus* species were collected from a freezer (located in the [] suite hallway) known to house the materials. None of the culture or environmental samples tested to date genetically match the non-anthraxis *Bacillus* contaminant discovered in the Fall 2001, Post and Brokaw threat letters. It is possible that refrigerators and freezers located in room [] may contain samples of non-anthraxis *Bacillus*. Any identifiable (via labeling) non-anthraxis *Bacillus* species should be collected from room []

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3) Digital media and storage items

Digital media and storage items will be collected from Dr. Ivins's cold-side change room lockers, [] space, and rooms [] and []. The collection of digital media items will be performed under the guidance of the on-scene CART examiner.

4) General evidence

This is meant to serve as a reminder to be observant for potential items of interest during the overall search and collection process. Items of interest include; notes, envelopes, paper envelope bands, tape, items with pieces of tape, and documents that may be evidence of involvement in the anthrax mailings. Questions regarding the collection of potential items of interest will be addressed by on-scene AMERITHRAX personnel.

[] Refrigerators and Freezers

Dr. Ivins has laboratory space in [] as well as [] laboratory space. Refrigerators and freezers located within Dr. Ivins's [] laboratory space may house non-anthraxis *Bacillus* samples. It is known that Dr. Ivins maintains non-pathogenic samples of *Bacillus anthracis* as well as non-viable, gamma irradiated samples of *Bacillus anthracis*. If the *Bacillus subtilis* contaminant originated from USAMRIID, the samples described here may possess genetic signatures of the *Bacillus subtilis* contaminant. Samples of non-anthraxis *Bacillus* (as identified via labeling) and strains of *Bacillus*

To: Counterterrorism From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/17/2007

anthracis will be collected and submitted for analyses at the
[redacted]

USAMRIID building 1412 and 1425 cold-side change rooms

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Lockers will be identified by AMERITHRAX investigators. It may be necessary to cut or physically defeat locks securing the lockers. If it is necessary to cut locks securing the lockers, upon completion of the search and sampling, key locks will be used to secure the lockers and the keys provided to USAMRIID Command.

Bacteriology Division Room [redacted]

Since room [redacted] is office space where unvaccinated personnel are permitted, the search of this space will be performed by AMERITHRAX personnel who are more familiar with the identification of items of interest. It has been explained to AMERITHRAX Investigators that Dr. Ivins has several locked drawers in room [redacted]. If the keys to these drawers are not available, the locking mechanisms will be physically defeated. Upon completion of the search of room [redacted] environmental samples will be collected from within the return vent ductwork and other areas wherein the non-anthraxis *Bacillus* contaminant may be found.

Consent to search will be requested from [redacted]
[redacted] on Wednesday, October 24, 2007. Although, it is anticipated that consent will be provided to perform the search, secured locker and office spaces will be included within the language of a search warrant issued in the District of Columbia. In the event that consent is denied, the search will proceed under the authority of the search warrant. All search personnel will be advised of the authority (consent and/or warrant) by which the search is to proceed. The search warrant includes the residence, vehicles, office space, laboratory work space, and cold-side lockers as the areas to be searched. All of these searches will be concurrent.

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Residence and Vehicles

The residence is located [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

The address for the residence is:

[redacted]
Frederick, Maryland

To: Counterterrorism From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/17/2007

The residence is two stories in stature with a below-ground basement. Also located on the premises is a wooden shed behind the house.

There are five (5) vehicles registered to the Ivins's residence. The vehicles will be processed inside a large garage structure on the Fort Detrick Post, proximate to the other two search locations (See enclosure). The garage structure is of sufficient size that all vehicles can be parked inside at once. It is preferred that the vehicles be processed two at a time in the order determined by the Vehicle Search Team Leader.

The vehicles are described as:

MD



Bruce Edwards Ivins




Frederick, MD

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MD



Bruce Edwards Ivins



Frederick, MD


MD



MD



To: Counterterrorism From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/17/2007



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
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b7E

Since the residence and vehicles are utilized by unvaccinated personnel, it is suggested that these searches be conducted by AMERITHRAX, ERT, and CART personnel. Once the search of the residence and vehicles have been completed, HMRT personnel will collect environmental samples following the direction of the HMRU personnel.

Operational Execution

The first operational step of the searches will be a meeting on [redacted] between [redacted]

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To: Counterterrorism From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/17/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

b6
b7C

WMD DIRECTORATE

AT HEADQUARTERS

For information only.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

WASHINGTON FIELD (CT10 / HMRT Leader)

AT HEADQUARTERS CITY

Provide HMRT support to mission. The AMERITHRAX POC
for questions regarding any HMRT aspects is SA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Set Lead 3: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD (CT10 / ERT Leader)

AT HEADQUARTERS CITY

ERT members familiar with the AMERITHRAX
Investigation will be assisting with the searches. The
AMERITHRAX POC for questions regarding any ERT aspects is SA
[REDACTED]

Set Lead 4: (Action)

WASHINGTON FIELD (IS4 / CART Leader)

AT HEADQUARTERS CITY

Provide CART support to mission. The AMERITHRAX
POC for questions regarding any CART aspects is SA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Set Lead 5: (Info)

BALTIMORE

AT HEADQUARTERS CITY

For information purposes.

To: Counterterrorism From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/17/2007

Set Lead 6: (Action)

LABORATORY (CBSU)

AT QUANTICO, VA

The AMERITHRAX Task Force requests the Chemical Biological Sciences Unit provide contractual, logistical, and financial support for the analyses of collected items. Environmental swabs and laboratory samples should be screened for the presence of the non-anthraxis *Bacillus* contaminant found in the evidentiary spore powders from the Fall 2001 anthrax attacks. The AMERITHRAX POC for questions regarding any CBSU aspects is SA [REDACTED]

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Set Lead 7: (Action)

LABORATORY (HMRU)

AT QUANTICO, VA

The AMERITHRAX Task Force requests the Hazardous Materials Response Unit provide Safety, Scientific, and Logistical support for the searches. The AMERITHRAX POC for questions regarding any HMRU aspects is SA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

ARMED AND DANGEROUS

♦♦

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 10/12/2007

On September 24, 2007, [redacted] Social Security Account Number (SSAN) [redacted] was interviewed, as pre-arranged, at [redacted] place of employment, address: the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), [redacted] Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication is a Non-disclosure Agreement Form [redacted] voluntarily read and signed.)

[redacted] is currently [redacted] at USAMRIID. [redacted]

[redacted] advised that upon [redacted] arrival to USAMRIID in [redacted] as [redacted] was initially involved in [redacted] research until approximately [redacted]

As the topic of conversation switched to USAMRIID [redacted] commented that [redacted] is [redacted]

Investigation on 09/24/2007 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1764 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]
PI [redacted]

FILENAME [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 09/24/2007, Page 2

_____ opined that there was no way anyone at USAMRIID could or would have been involved in the 2001 anthrax-laced letter mailings. _____ recalled that _____ was very angry and upset because

_____ advised that _____ the other researchers at USAMRIID are frustrated and disenchanted with the lack of concern and lack of support related services given to them at USAMRIID. Many of the employees are "fed up" with the level of bureaucracy that exists at USAMRIID. They are frustrated with the frequency of how things get lost or misplaced.

_____ advised that the anthrax investigation has definitely affected BRUCE IVINS. _____ explained that IVINS has a strange sense of humor but that _____ feels that IVINS has a good heart. _____ advised that IVINS even does volunteer work for the American Red Cross. _____ recalled that approximately one year ago, IVINS _____ in tears complaining about the anthrax investigation. _____

_____ believes that IVINS is planning on retiring in about a year. _____

_____ opined that _____ appears to be the likely candidate to replace IVINS or that USAMRIID may just hire somebody new to replace IVINS.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 10/12/2007

On October 12, 2007 [redacted] was interviewed, as pre-arranged, at [redacted] place of employment, address: the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), [redacted] Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication is a Non-disclosure Agreement Form [redacted] voluntarily read and signed.)

[redacted] is currently [redacted] employee at USAMRIID

[redacted] received [redacted] degree in [redacted] from [redacted] [redacted] advised that [redacted] first arrived at USAMRIID in [redacted] as a [redacted] [redacted] began working for [redacted] in the [redacted] Division until [redacted] at [redacted]

[redacted] was queried concerning former USAMRIID visiting scientist [redacted] acknowledged knowing of [redacted] but never having met or worked with [redacted]

[redacted] advised that it was [redacted] understanding that [redacted] and [redacted] collaborated on research projects while at USAMRIID. [redacted] advised that [redacted] has traveled extensively overseas. [redacted] did not know where [redacted] spore preparations were kept. A significant portion of [redacted]

[redacted] understood that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) search at USAMRIID in 2004 had to be done and

Investigation on 10/12/2007 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1745 Date dictated N/A

SA [redacted]
by PI [redacted]

FILENAME: [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 10/12/2007, Page 2

that the investigation has uncovered some kind of connection between USAMRIID and the anthrax-laced letter evidence.

[REDACTED] was somewhat familiar with former USAMRIID researcher [REDACTED] but only by name only. [REDACTED] had never worked with [REDACTED] had heard about [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] commented that [REDACTED] appear before the Grand Jury investigating the anthrax-laced letter mailings. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] When asked about [REDACTED] Grand Jury testimony [REDACTED] recently replied that [REDACTED] could not talk about it.

[REDACTED] recalled the FBI search conducted at USAMRIID in 2004 and advised that [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] indicated that BRUCE IVINS has not been saying much, lately. IVINS still jokes around, but not as frequently as in the past. IVINS, [REDACTED] have openly discussed their belief that the FBI are conducting surveillance on them. IVINS at one point believed that in 2004, a female FBI agent had moved into the residence right next door to him. IVINS claimed to have noticed the agent wearing a firearm underneath her clothing while cutting the lawn. According to IVINS, the FBI agent moved out a few months later. [REDACTED] advised that IVINS frequently attends [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 10/02/2007

[redacted] the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, was interviewed, as pre-arranged, at [redacted] place of employment on the afternoon of September 25, 2007. [redacted] was already familiar with the identity of the interview Special Agent (SA), after being advised of the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] recalled [redacted] was upset after [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 09/25/2007 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1769 Date dictated N/Aby SA [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 11/09/2007

On October 12, 2007, [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] residence, [redacted] telephone number [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication is a Non-disclosure Agreement Form [redacted] voluntarily read and signed.)

[redacted] advised that [redacted] plans on [redacted] [redacted] currently works at USAMRIID in the [redacted] Division as a [redacted]. For the past [redacted] years [redacted] has been extensively involved in the [redacted].

[redacted] acknowledged that [redacted] at USAMRIID have recently had to go before a Grand Jury and answer questions related the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001 [redacted]

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It is [redacted] opinion that most likely the anthrax mailer is an individual who is associated with a foreign country and is not a U.S. citizen or homegrown terrorist. [redacted] could not think of anyone at USAMRIID who would have been involved in the anthrax mailings. [redacted] opined that BRUCE IVINS and [redacted] both have eccentric type personalities but that they are benign and would not intentionally hurt anyone.

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b7CInvestigation on 10/12/2007 at [redacted]File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1771Date dictated N/Aby SA [redacted]
PI [redacted]

FILENAME: [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 10/12/2007, Page 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] recalled the ensuing swabbing efforts conducted at USAMRIID in Building 1425 shortly after the arrival of the anthrax-laced letter evidence; first by BRUCE IVINS and then by USAMRIID personnel. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] recalled that initially IVINS had approached [REDACTED] about his desire to conduct swabbing of his various work areas in Building 1425 and that [REDACTED] advised IVINS not to do it. [REDACTED] recalled that IVINS did the swabbing anyway. USAMRIID subsequently initiated an investigation (15-6 investigation) into IVIN's unauthorized swabbing activities.

[REDACTED] advised that the investigation was not done thoroughly because USAMRIID management assigned the investigation to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was not the best person to conduct the inquiry and consequently [REDACTED] did not ask the tough questions.

[REDACTED] explained that the subsequent authorized survey conducted at USAMRIID was done backwards. USAMRIID appeared to place more of an emphasis on swabbing the hot suites first as opposed to swabbing the cold areas of Building 1425 first.

[REDACTED] opined that IVINS can be a very persistent individual and that he and [REDACTED]

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It was

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 10/12/2007, Page 3

[REDACTED] belief that IVINS [REDACTED] theorized that contamination of the cold side of 1425 likely occurred because of sloppy and unsafe lab practices exhibited by the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. [REDACTED] reiterated that IVINS is not a malignant person. [REDACTED] recalled that once, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IVINS was bemoaning his trouble pertaining to his un-authorized swabbing event. [REDACTED] advised that he angrily confronted IVINS on the matter, informing IVINS that he brought the matter upon himself. [REDACTED] recalled IVINS did not respond to the challenge but simply withdrew.

[REDACTED] opined that whoever was responsible for the anthrax-laced letter mailings most likely would have had to have some kind of knowledge pertaining to the weaponizing of biological agents. [REDACTED] advised that USAMRIID maintains [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Building [REDACTED] which contains this type of information.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

b6
b7CDate of transcription 12/27/2007

On December 14, 2007, [redacted] Social Security Account Number (SSAN) [redacted] Date of Birth (DOB): [redacted]

[redacted] Telephone number: [redacted]
[redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication is a Non-disclosure Agreement Form [redacted] voluntarily read and signed.)

[redacted] advised that [redacted] had recently been made aware of recent Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) searches conducted at USAMRIID due to various signs that had been left behind by investigators, such as; hood lines being turned off that should have been left on, refrigerators that had been locked had been left un-locked, ultra violet lights had been turned off, and search warrant documentation left on desk. [redacted] advised that the search warrant documents were subsequently turned over to [redacted] who subsequently turned over the documentation to USAMRIID

[redacted] explained that BRUCE IVINS [redacted] and members of his family had been interviewed by the FBI. IVINS informed [redacted] that his home and vehicles were also searched. IVINS informed [redacted] that during the various family interviews, FBI agents had insinuated that he was responsible for the deaths of 5 people. IVINS informed [redacted] that FBI agents had specifically informed [redacted]

[redacted] BRUCE IVINS will no longer speak to [redacted] and blames [redacted] for much of the recent events that have transpired. IVINS is of the belief that [redacted] had spoken negatively about him to the FBI resulting in a wedge being driven between IVINS and [redacted]

[redacted] emphatically advised that [redacted] in the [redacted] Division at USAMRIID do not consciously believe that IVINS had anything to do with the 2001 anthrax-laced letter

Investigation on 12/14/2007 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1774 Date dictated N/A

SA [redacted]
by PI [redacted]

FILENAME [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 12/14/2007, Page 2

mailings. [REDACTED] explained [REDACTED] theory in part by claiming that IVINS was not capable of the anthrax-laced mailings because IVINS is not capable of keeping his mouth shut and therefore would have told somebody by now. [REDACTED] also believes that IVINS did not have any involvement with the anthrax-laced letter mailings because he is too kind-hearted and generous. [REDACTED] clarified that these are [REDACTED] opinions. [REDACTED] advised that IVINS is a musician as well as an artist, poet and that IVINS is very highly thought of by his co-workers at the American Red Cross.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] IVINS is a solid scientist that has in the past provided a lot of assistance to many other researchers at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] IVINS has done great work in the past,

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] further expounded that although IVINS's research and research results and ideas are impeccable, IVINS's lab technique is not "great" or "neat." [REDACTED] described IVINS's house cleaning as "horrible" but emphasized that IVINS kept thorough notes on his research projects and that his work product was reliable and consistent.

[REDACTED] confirmed that in the recent past, there had been a lot of joking around and humor directed at the anthrax-laced letter investigation and various researchers. [REDACTED] stated that all joking has stopped and opined that [REDACTED] believed the frequent jokes were simply a means to release tension and frustration that had built up as a result of the investigation. [REDACTED] indicated that

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] advised that if the interviewing agents had specific questions pertaining to such discussions that [REDACTED] would make [REDACTED] available for re-interview after the new year.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 12/14/2007, Page 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] described the current research climate at USAMRIID as very tense and pressured. [REDACTED] explained that a significant reason for the negative environment is due to a lack of funding for the various research projects. [REDACTED] explained that funding for various projects has become increasingly harder to obtain and that much of the funding over the past few years has evolved from hard money to soft (grants) money.

[REDACTED] advised that currently IVINS is not permitted access into the hot suites and believes this directive was initiated by the Personal Responsibility Program (PRP) office at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] indicated that management at USAMRIID has always known IVINS suffers from depression. [REDACTED] indicated that events such as the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks often would send IVINS into depression. Employees at USAMRIID have assumed for many years that IVINS and [REDACTED], do not get along. IVINS does not talk about [REDACTED] or family very often. [REDACTED] confirmed that IVINS works a lot of hours at USAMRIID, including frequent late night hours. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] scrutiny of his (IVINS) or any other researchers late night activity in the hot suites is not conducted. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] can understand a researchers mind set that the hot suite can often provide a sort of "cocoon" kind of environment. One in which an employee can feel comfortable in when having a desire for peace and privacy. [REDACTED] insinuated that [REDACTED] has felt that way before. [REDACTED] further described the hot suites as a place to escape.

[REDACTED] explained that [REDACTED] did not know what type of activities IVINS specifically did outside of USAMRIID. [REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED] had knowledge of IVINS's office computer and the internet computer in the B3 hot suite [REDACTED] was not aware of any abnormally high volume of spams or pop-ups on IVINS computers. [REDACTED] volunteered that [REDACTED] receives a lot of "junk" e-mails on [REDACTED] own office computer, [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 12/27/2007

On December 12, 2007, [redacted] Social Security Account Number (SSAN): [redacted] Date of Birth (DOB) [redacted], was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, as well as being reminded of a previous Non-Disclosure Agreement Form he had signed, [redacted] provided the following information:

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(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication is a Form FD-597, FBI Receipt for Property, which [redacted] signed thereby acknowledging the return of two laboratory notebooks, numbered [redacted] and [redacted])

Upon reviewing portions of the above described laboratory notebook, [redacted] acknowledged specific entries in the notebook which identify [redacted] as having received 1 milliliter (ml) of *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) (Dugway) spores for research on a project. [redacted] commented that it appeared that [redacted] received the one milliliter (ml) of Ba from BRUCE IVINS and subsequently plated out approximately 10 micro-milliliters for the research project [redacted] has been working on. Based on the laboratory notebook entries, [redacted]

[redacted] confirmed that between [redacted] and [redacted] was [redacted] at USAMRIID. [redacted] acknowledged knowing BRUCE IVINS very well and indicated that it was not uncommon for IVINS to be working many late night hours at USAMRIID in the hot suites. [redacted] indicated that IVINS and others were very busy conducting research which pertained to being able to manage the threat posed to American soldiers not yet vaccinated against certain biological agents, such as anthrax. [redacted]

Investigation on 12/12/2007 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 175 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]
PI [redacted]

FILENAME: [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

b6
b7CContinuation of FD-302 of _____, On 12/12/2007, Page -2-

explained that during these critical studies, some 4000 injections to monkeys had taken place, Twice a day monkeys were anesthetize. Because of the Gulf War many researchers were asked to perform many menial tasks that they did not want to perform.

_____ was not aware of any significant animosity or unhappiness that IVINS may have harbored towards _____ while at USAMRIID. _____ advised that over the years IVINS has become more and more less interested in science. _____ described IVINS as a "nice" guy. IVINS's laboratory notes are usually very good and would be surprised if his notes where anything other than good. _____ advised that when IVINS conducts experiments, his write-ups are very detailed and thorough. _____ indicated that _____ had recently reviewed a report from IVINS which appeared to be very thorough detailed.

_____ advised that to _____ knowledge, IVINS has always grown *Ba* spores in flasks not fermentors. _____ advised that _____ are current or former USAMRIID researchers that to _____ knowledge utilized fermentors to grow *Ba*. _____ opined that _____ would not have been necessary to have produced the volume of *Ba* used in the anthrax-laced letter mailings.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 12/26/2007b6
b7c

On December 6, 2007, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] telephone number [REDACTED] was interviewed and after being advised of the purpose of the interview provided the following information:

[REDACTED] advised that the [REDACTED] does provide lockers for both male and female members and their guests. He explained that there are approximately 162 lockers in the men's locker room and slightly fewer in the women's locker room. [REDACTED] indicated that as a result of a lottery type system instituted two years ago, only about 30 of the mens lockers and 17 of the women's lockers have been permanently issued. The remaining lockers are for use on a first come first serve basis.

[REDACTED] further explained that anyone using the facility, including those members who have assigned lockers, are not permitted to use their own personal locks but must use a lock issued and controlled by members of the [REDACTED]. Those individuals not assigned a permanent locker must sign out a lock and return the lock prior to exiting the facility. All of the locks issued by the [REDACTED] have a master key [REDACTED] and can be used to open and remove the locks at any time. [REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED] discovered an unauthorized personal lock on a locker in the past [REDACTED].

(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication is an 8 page report entitled, Locker Post Card Confirmation Report.)

As questioning continued, [REDACTED] was asked if he was familiar with United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) employees [REDACTED] ~~BRUCE IVINS~~, and [REDACTED] responded in the affirmative and indicated that all three of the named USAMRIID employees are frequent users of the fitness center. [REDACTED] advised that he has

Investigation on 12/06/2007 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1776 Date dictated n/a

by PI [REDACTED]

FILENAME: [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 12/06/2007, Page 2

been at Fort Detrick for [REDACTED] years and knows [REDACTED] if not by name, by face. He indicated that he has been at Fort Detrick [REDACTED] since [REDACTED] advised that

[REDACTED]

Pertaining to BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED] advised that coincidentally, he had recently discovered [REDACTED] [REDACTED] sometime in the fall of [REDACTED], that he was receiving strange foreign originating "junk" e-mails on his Fort Detrick computer addressed to BRUCE IVINS at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] initially ignored and deleted the "junk" e-mails for many months without opening the e-mails up. It wasn't until one day in [REDACTED] that he decided to actually open up one of the e-mails and realized that the foreign originating e-mails appeared to be addressed to IVINS. [REDACTED] advised that the e-mails appeared to be of a Russian origin

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] indicated that they would investigate the matter however they never got back to him. [REDACTED] advised that he still gets an occasional foreign originating "junk" e-mail on his computer addressed to IVINS.

[REDACTED] further advised that he was of the opinion that some of the IVINS related "junk" e-mails were of a pornographic-sexual nature. He recalled that one of the e-mails appeared to depict a minimally dressed female and other e-mails appeared to contain sexually oriented solicitations pertaining to such topics as; penile enlargement, Viagra, sexual freedom, and impotency. [REDACTED] advised that upon opening one of the e-mails and further researching the origination web site, he discovered, by way of translating the Russian script into English, that the web site actually appeared to be associated with some form of pharmaceuticals. [REDACTED] advised that he purges his deleted e-mail file once a week. Upon reviewing his e-mail files he was able to locate 3 historic deleted e-mails which were sent to his e-mail account on his computer but were addressed to IVINS. [REDACTED] printed the 3 e-mails out and they are maintained in the FD-340 associated with this communication.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 12/06/2007, Page 3

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Staying on the topic of BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED] described IVINS as very weird and eccentric and further described him as a "nerd." He stated that he has not had any problems with IVINS nor has he had any problems with [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] advised that he occasionally finds himself laughing to himself regarding IVINS because of IVINS's lack of exercise technique and his overall workout appearance. He explained that IVINS would often come in to the fitness center and work out on the treadmill dressed in his work boots and dark socks as well as his entire work clothes. [REDACTED] advised that he recalled an incident that took place approximately a year ago involving IVINS and an unknown former Navy Seal or Marine. [REDACTED] recalled that IVINS came storming out of the sauna one day alleging that an individual whom IVINS was sharing the sauna with was going to kill him. IVINS explained to [REDACTED] that this individual suddenly became very angry and hostile towards him and threatened to "kick his ass." IVINS explained that all he (IVINS) was doing in the sauna was rubbing oil on his legs. [REDACTED] advised that IVINS had been totally, "butt," naked in the sauna and that the individual had taken offense to the manner in which IVINS was oiling his legs and perceived IVINS actions as being of a sexually aggressive nature. [REDACTED] could not recall the identity of this individual but suggested that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] also is familiar with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] agreed to conduct further research into [REDACTED] pertaining to BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED] and agreed to meet again tomorrow morning for additional follow-up.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 12/26/2007b6
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On December 7, 2007, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] telephone number [REDACTED] as a follow-up to previous interview on December 6, 2007, was re-interviewed as well as given a Non-Disclosure Agreement form to sign. After being advised of the purpose of the interview [REDACTED] provided the following information:

(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication is a Non-Disclosure Agreement Form.)

[REDACTED] immediately provided a computerized detailed report, dating back to April of 2004, which listed the various dates and times for which [REDACTED] ~~BRUCE~~ ~~IVINS~~ visited/used the [REDACTED]. Enclosed herewith in the FD-340 associated with this communication are the aforementioned Pass Visit Logs. (12)

[REDACTED] advised that he was unable to ascertain the identity of the former Navy Seal or Marine with whom BRUCE IVINS had a confrontation with in the sauna last year. [REDACTED] opined that it was his impression that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] indicated that his computer at the [REDACTED] is not accessible to members or their guests but is maintained in his office at all times under lock and key. He advised that to the best of his knowledge, BRUCE IVINS has not access to his computer at the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Investigation on 12/07/2007 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1777 Date dictated N/Aby PI
SA

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 12/26/2007

On December 10, 2007, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], telephone number [REDACTED] after being advised of the purpose of the interview and signing a Non-Disclosure Agreement, provided the following information:

(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication is a Non-Disclosure Agreement Form.)

[REDACTED] explained that [REDACTED] operates a Plasma Donation Center under a contract with the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] solicits individuals, particularly those individuals already vaccinated against anthrax, for their plasma. They do this by offering donors various sums of money for their plasma as well as offering monetary incentives to those individuals whom recruit others into the donor program [REDACTED] and other such plasma collection entities often locate their businesses in close proximity to military research institutions for the opportunity to attract or recruit individuals from a larger and more qualified pool of donors. [REDACTED] has demonstrated a significant need to increase its stockpile of plasma needed to maintain sufficient quantities of the anthrax vaccine. (P) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED] during this past weekend, placed an add in the [REDACTED] (newspaper) soliciting individuals at Fort Detrick for their plasma. [REDACTED] confirmed that an individual identifying himself as BRUCE IVINS had left a voice message [REDACTED] inquiring about the advertisement in the newspaper. [REDACTED] advised that IVINS has not yet had any personal contact with anyone in her office. [REDACTED] explained that [REDACTED] works closely with the Fort Detrick Special Immunization Program in seeking qualified donors. She advised that there are several screening steps involved before they can accept a donor into the program and that IVINS has not yet begun this phase. [REDACTED] advised that she would contact the interviewing Postal Inspector should she obtain any additional pertinent information.

Investigation on 12/10/2007 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1778 Date dictated N/Aby PI
SA [REDACTED]

FILED [REDACTED]

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 1/14/2008b6
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On January 8, 2008, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted], Social Security Account Number [redacted] cellular
telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of
employment, [redacted]

[redacted] work telephone number [redacted]

[redacted] After being advised of the
identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information:

(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this
communication is a Non-disclosure Agreement Form [redacted]
voluntarily read and signed.)

[redacted] confirmed that [redacted] is familiar with [redacted]
USAMRIID employee [redacted] and that [redacted], BRUCE IVINS,
and others from the Bacteriology Division often played Scrabble or
Boggle during their lunch hour. [redacted] advised that IVINS also
frequently played as did [redacted] indicated that

[redacted] advised that IVINS got along well with [redacted]
but could not offer any further information on the relationship
that existed between IVINS and [redacted] characterized
IVINS as someone who is very "odd" and "goofy." [redacted] described IVINS
as the "nutty professor," but, whose science skills were strong.
[redacted] could not offer much information pertaining to IVINS
knowledge of fermentor use [redacted] had never seen IVINS use a
fermentor. IVINS had always used shaker flasks when growing
Bacillus anthracis (Ba) [redacted] indicated that [redacted] was [redacted]
familiar with the existence [redacted] of various fermentors at
USAMRIID. [redacted]

Investigation on 1/8/2008 at Fort Detrick, MDFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1779Date dictated N/Aby PI
SA [redacted]

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FILE NAME: [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 1/8/2008, Page 2

[REDACTED]

At USAMRIID, [REDACTED] was familiar with a 5 l, 20 l, and a 100 l fermentors. The 100 l fermentor (actual 80 (l) working volume) was maintained in the [REDACTED] laboratory suites in Building 1425. [REDACTED] indicated that it was never used other than on occasion water was run through it just to ensure that it was still operational. [REDACTED] explained that when using the 20 l fermentor, it took one day for the fermentor to complete the growth cycle for Delta Stern Ba.

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[REDACTED] advised that the 5 l fermentor, when operational, did not produce a whole lot of noise. [REDACTED] opined that the easiest way to have produce the volume of Ba used in the anthrax-laced letter mailings would have been to use shaker flasks as opposed to using fermentors. [REDACTED] expounded that using the shaker flask method to grow Ba would have been much less conspicuous because shaker flasks are always in use at USAMRIID anyway. [REDACTED] advised that 8 one liter flasks could be run at the same time in a shaker incubator. [REDACTED] believed that there is one shaker incubator, known in IVINS [REDACTED] laboratory and a second shaker incubator, known as "Big Bertha," in the [REDACTED] suites.

When using the fermentors, [REDACTED] recalled that it was standard operating procedures when growing Ba to use anti-foam in order to reduce the buildup of bubbles or foam that would occur during the fermentation process. [REDACTED] explained that anti-foam would be automatically pumped into the fermentor to reduce the amount of bubbles. [REDACTED] recalled that the old brand name for the anti-foaming agent was called Mazu and believed that Mazu may have been sold out or taken over by a newer company possibly called Sigma.

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] does not recall IVINS having any discussions concerning either fraternities or sororities. [REDACTED] recalled that IVINS often sung show tunes around the office. IVINS rarely talked about [REDACTED] his personal life. IVINS was not very open about his personal life. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] frequently picked on IVINS but clarified that it was not excessive. [REDACTED] explained that [REDACTED] picked on IVINS because IVINS was such an easy target due

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 1/8/2008, Page 3

to IVINS being an "odd ball" and "goofy." [REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED] never got the feeling that IVINS was or could have been involved in the anthrax-laced letter mailings.

[REDACTED] humorously recalled the last occasion in which [REDACTED] had any contact with IVINS. This occurred was when [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 01/10/2008

[redacted] Social Security Account Number
(SSAN): [redacted] met as pre-arranged at [redacted]
[redacted] located in Frederick, Maryland, on the afternoon
on January 09, 2008. [redacted] who was already familiar with
the identity of the interviewing Special Agent (SA) was advised of
the nature of the interview, and provided the following
information:

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[redacted] re-iterated that [redacted] a visiting
scientist to the United States Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) [redacted]
[redacted] received a small quantity of the Ames
strain of *Bacillus anthracis*, also known as RMR 1029, from USAMRIID
employee BRUCE IVINS while [redacted] was at USAMRIID. [redacted]

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[redacted] advised the [redacted]
[redacted], whom [redacted] had previously met at [redacted]
[redacted] had approached [redacted] prior to [redacted] arrival at
USAMRIID. USAMRIID and [redacted] undertook a cooperative agreement
in which [redacted] would attain the Ames strain of *Bacillus*
anthracis from USAMRIID. [redacted]

Investigation on 01/09/2008 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1780 Date dictated N/Aby SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 01/09/2008, Page 2

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

As an aside, [redacted] was queried as to [redacted] scientific opinion pertaining to IVINS. [redacted] indicated IVINS was both an "ideas guy" and a "hands guy," meaning that IVINS was able to come up with novel scientific ideas as well as had the laboratory skills to conduct the experiments to test his ideas.

[redacted] was unaware of any talk about switching IVINS from anthrax-vaccine work to glanders-research; however, opined [redacted] or [redacted] may be knowledgeable of such things.

[redacted] advised IVINS was odd and did odd things at USAMRIID. [redacted] indicated that IVINS's covert swabbing efforts, after he was specifically instructed not to it, was an example of his odd behavior. [redacted] opined that most of USAMRIID viewed IVINS's swabbing efforts as his trying to show that [redacted] was sloppy" in their handling of evidence relating to the anthrax-laced letter mailings. [redacted] affirmed that one could also view IVINS's swabbing efforts as identifying the possible trail the anthrax-laced letters took if they were in fact loaded in the [redacted] hot suite; however, [redacted] had no specific knowledge or information that could assist the FBI pertaining to this matter.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 01/09/2008, Page 3

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[REDACTED] noted IVINS was excluded from certain "projects," meaning USAMRIID research that directly supported the U.S. Intelligence Community. [REDACTED] indicated although IVINS was excluded, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] did not know why IVINS did not seek out such projects out of patriotism or as an ample source of funding.

[REDACTED] IVINS never sought out projects pertaining to U.S. Intelligence Community, [REDACTED] has never heard IVINS make any remark or comment that one could construe as disloyal or disparaging to the U.S., the U.S. government, or its foreign policies.

[REDACTED] advised IVINS is currently interested in

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[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] would become the [REDACTED] at USAMRIID due to [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] agreed to re-contact writer should [REDACTED] recall or attain any additional pertinent information.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Confidential Human Source (CHS) Reporting Document

Reporting Date: 01/09/2008

Case ID: ✓279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) - 178/
[redacted] (Pending)

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Contact Date: 12/27/2007

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
Type of Contact: In person

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Location: Frederick, Maryland

Written by: SA [redacted]

Other(s) Present: None



Source Reporting:

On [redacted] a Confidential Human Source (CHS), who is **NOT** in a position to testify, provided the following information:

[Large redacted box for source information]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

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Date of transcription 1/23/2008

On January 22, 2008, [] United States Army Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) []
[] telephone number [], was
interviewed telephonically by Postal Inspector [] as a brief
follow-up to the January 15, 2008 interview writer conducted with
[] provided the following information:

As in the previous interview on January 15, 2008,
[] advised that sometime in the summer of 2001, []

[] recalled discussions taking place
specifically pertaining to BRUCE IVINS and the possibility of
refocusing IVINS's research agenda from anthrax vaccine to
Burkholderia mallei (glanders). [] provided the names of
Fort Detrick employees []
[] who could possibly provide more specific information
relative to the [] Divisions short term and long term
research objectives back in 2001. []

Investigation on 1/22/2008 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1782Date dictated N/A

by PI []

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FILED []

[REDACTED]

The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent [REDACTED] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on January 17, 2007:

As previously reported, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was a visiting scientist at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, [REDACTED] (279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 1129). In addition, it has been previously reported that the research derived from this visit was published in a reputable scientific journal (279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 1101).

It should be noted that examination of that publication indicated the Ames strain *Bacillus anthracis* spores used by [REDACTED] et al were produced via the same method that USAMRIID scientists BRUCE IVINS et al had previously published in a 1995 article. (Ivins, B., [REDACTED] et al. Experimental anthrax vaccines: efficacy of adjuvants combined with protective antigen against an aerosol *Bacillus anthracis* spore challenge in guinea pigs. Vaccine 1995; 13:1779-1784.)

This would strongly indicate that the Ames strain *Bacillus anthracis* spores used by [REDACTED] were derived from spores produced at USAMRIID and were not RMR 1029 derived spores. It should also be noted that the first draw on RMR 1029 wasn't until September 17, 1998 (279A-WF-USAMRIID, Serial 1716).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 1/16/2008

On January 15, 2008, former United States Army Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) [redacted] was interviewed by FBI Special Agent [redacted] and Postal Inspector [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] advised that [redacted] no longer works at Fort Detrick, Maryland. [redacted] is currently employed as [redacted]

[redacted] was asked to reflect [redacted] upon [redacted] laboratory experience at USAMRIID, specifically [redacted] thoughts and perception as they pertain to time expended in the hot suites. [redacted] advised that containment work done in the hot suite often provided a "nice" place to work, and an environment whereby one could "escape" from the daily everyday pressures associated with work. [redacted]

[redacted] indicated that it was somewhat unusual for an employee to go home and then enter the hot suite late at night on a frequent basis. [redacted] reiterated that it [redacted] opinion that most late night hot suite activity was a result of work that was required as an extension of a normal work day.

[redacted] indicated that there were a few USAMRIID researchers who were famous for working frequent and long late night hours in the laboratories. [redacted] identified [redacted] BRUCE IVINS, [redacted] as three researchers who fell into that category. [redacted]

In attempts to recall [redacted] role at USAMRIID back in the time frame of September 11, 2001, [redacted] advised that [redacted]

Investigation on 1/15/2008 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1785

Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]
PI [redacted]

FILENAME [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 01/15/2008, Page 2

[REDACTED]

Upon [REDACTED] arrival at USAMRIID [REDACTED] was briefed concerning the [REDACTED] Division and its personnel; however, [REDACTED] had no specific recollection of [REDACTED] indicating to [REDACTED] that IVINS was undergoing significant personal or family problems. [REDACTED] recalled that on occasion, [REDACTED] [REDACTED], IVINS would make a comment concerning his marital status or the like, but [REDACTED] never knew whether to take IVINS serious or not. [REDACTED] recalled that IVINS was not open about his personal life.

When [REDACTED] reported to USAMRIID [REDACTED] [REDACTED] indicated that the "writing was on the wall," explaining that a shift in research priorities from anthrax-vaccine work to other research had begun. [REDACTED] explained that it became apparent from "[the command] across the street," (Fort Detrick Command Staff) and USAMRIID Command, [REDACTED] that funding for the various anthrax-vaccine research programs had dried up as there was a concerted effort to shift from vaccine research into therapeutics, as therapeutics was where the research funds were.

Based on discussions at [REDACTED] Division [REDACTED] meetings, whose participants were: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Because the remaining [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (i.e. anthrax-vaccine work) was viewed as menial in nature, and a waste of IVINS's talents, such tasks as validation assays, it was suggested that perhaps IVINS's should work on research pertaining to *Burkholderia mallei*.

According to [REDACTED] a concerted effort had begun to shift from anthrax-vaccine research, and vaccine research in general to therapeutic research. [REDACTED] clarified that the meetings and the subsequent plans to shift research priorities occurred just prior to the end of fiscal year 2001 (August 2001). [REDACTED] believed that word of management's intentions to shift anthrax-vaccine research had in fact filtered its way down to the individual researchers.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 01/15/2008, Page 3

[REDACTED] recalled that [REDACTED] BRUCE IVINS were not happy about the decision to move away from anthrax-vaccine work. [REDACTED] recalled that when it was brought to IVINS's attention to work on glanders, IVINS was upset and made statements such as, "I'm an anthrax researcher! That is what I do."

[REDACTED] impression of IVINS was that he was a government scientist who was very comfortable with where he was at, and that IVINS was very reluctant to "change" at that point of his career. [REDACTED] affirmed IVINS was akin to an old dog who didn't want to learn a new trick. [REDACTED] recalled [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not recall IVINS taking the issue up the chain of command.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] reiterated that the overall feeling was that IVINS would not be content simply conducting everyday menial type laboratory tasks, such as plating and assay work, however IVINS was resistant to glanders research. At some point after the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001, [REDACTED] advised that due to imminent inspections and reviews that were schedule to take place during the new fiscal year, the [REDACTED] Division ultimately tasked IVINS with developing standard operating procedures pertaining to various spore preparations as there was a perceived need to provide anthrax-spores to various entities via a standardized and uniformed manner. IVINS was considered a pioneer in the field of spore preparations and their use in animal challenges so he was tasked with the charge.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] sometime in 2002, [REDACTED] to pull all the funding from the *Burkholderia mallei* (gladders) projects, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 01/15/2008, Page 4

reasoning behind his decision.

[REDACTED] recalled IVINS being more upset than others on September 11, 2001. IVINS thought that USAMRIID should evacuate as he believed the last un-accounted hijacked airplane was headed for USAMRIID. [REDACTED] recalled IVINS saying "We got to get out of here." [REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

It should be noted that at the conclusion of this interview, [REDACTED] was reminded of the Non-disclosure Agreement Form he voluntarily signed on October 12, 2007 and the utmost importance of not disclosing any information discussed during this interview.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 2/12/2008

On February 1, 2008, [redacted] Social Security Account Number (SSAN): [redacted] Date of Birth (DOB): [redacted] [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, as well as being reminded of a previous Non-Disclosure Agreement Form [redacted] had signed, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] was specifically asked questions pertaining to [redacted] knowledge and/or involvement relating to anthrax research at USAMRIID, particularly concerning the shift in research priorities from [redacted] research to other areas around the 2000 and 2001 time frame. [redacted] indicated that [redacted] could not recall any specific details regarding the shift in research priorities away from anthrax and into other areas other than to say that shifts of this nature are a constant at USAMRIID.

[redacted] explained that [redacted] research priorities constantly shift from one research area to another and individual researches have to make an adjustment but that it is an anticipated and ongoing aspect of research work at USAMRIID. [redacted] clarified that regardless of the various research funding shifts that have occurred back and forth over the years pertaining to the anthrax program, significant anthrax research continues to be conducted at USAMRIID today.

[redacted] recalled that back in the 1990s several researchers, [redacted] had to shift research priorities from anthrax related research to [redacted] gave this as an example of the constant nature in which researchers often need to be flexible and demonstrate an ability to adapt depending on the evolving research priorities at USAMRIID. [redacted] advised that there is always a certain level of constant tension but that is simply a norm in the work environment at USAMRIID.

[redacted] recalled that twenty five years ago the research environment was quite different than it is today. [redacted] explained that today there is significantly more oversight than in years past. Today, researchers are held more accountable; there is a greater emphasis and focus on products researchers develop.

Investigation on 2/1/2008 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1788 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]
PI [redacted]

FILENAME: [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 2/1/2008, Page 2

Researchers appear to complain much more frequently than in past years.

[REDACTED] advised that even today, anthrax research is still a significantly funded research program at USAMRIID. There is a continuous flow of dollars being allocated for anthrax research.

[REDACTED] advised that last year two million dollars were allocated at USAMRIID for anthrax research. [REDACTED] explained that unlike other research programs, such as glanders, funding for anthrax research has always been available. It would be understandable for researchers to have been upset had the anthrax program been completely dismantled and the funding stopped but that was not the case. [REDACTED] identified the primary anthrax researchers at USAMRIID as: [REDACTED], BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that in or around the 2001 time frame [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is certain that during this time frame [REDACTED] may have had numerous conversations with many people, including IVINS, concerning a number of topics revolving around various aspects of the anthrax program. However, [REDACTED] could not recall any specific details about any of the conversations [REDACTED] may have had with IVINS, specifically pertaining to the time period preceding the terrorists attacks in 2001.

[REDACTED] opined that [REDACTED] not USAMRIID have benefitted the most as far as research funding is concerned as a result of the 2001 anthrax-laced letter mailings. [REDACTED] reiterated that USAMRIID's anthrax research program has not benefitted at all as a result of the mailings.

[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] reiterated that [REDACTED] does not conduct any laboratory research work in the hot suites and that [REDACTED] would not know where any of the various Ba strains were stored.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

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Date of transcription 02/22/2008

On the afternoon of February 06, 2008, [redacted]
[redacted], Social Security Account Number (SSAN): [redacted] Date of
Birth (DOB): [redacted] Telephone Number: [redacted]

[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]
place of employment as pre-arranged. After being advised of the
identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information:

(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this
communication is a Non-disclosure Agreement Form [redacted]
voluntarily read and signed.)

[redacted] confirmed that [redacted]

[redacted] was asked for [redacted] perception as to the current status of
the anthrax investigation. [redacted] advised that it was [redacted]
understanding that "someone at USAMRIID is going to get nailed,"
and that the investigation appears to be focusing on BRUCE IVINS or
that IVINS was at the top of the "list." [redacted] had heard that
sometime in November 2007, IVINS's house had been searched and that
IVINS had subsequently taken a medical leave of absence. [redacted]

[redacted] opined that the anthrax powder used in the 2001
anthrax-laced letter mailings was most likely produced in
commercial type facility; as opposed to an academic type facility.
[redacted] suggested that investigators should be looking closely at
biological commercial type businesses such as [redacted]
[redacted] explained that companies such as [redacted]
produce large quantities of pesticides and other commercial
products. [redacted] continued. [redacted] produces large quantities of
dried [redacted] and was located not too far from
Princeton, New Jersey. [redacted] opined other such companies also
have experience producing dried biologicals. [redacted] advised that

Investigation on 02/06/2008 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1791

Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]
PI [redacted]

FILENAME: [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 02/06/2008, Page 2

to _____ knowledge researchers at USAMRIID never worked with dry spores just wet spore preparations of *Bacillus anthracis*.

_____ recalled that back in the September 11, 2001, time frame, both before and after the attacks, researchers in _____ Division were still conducting recombinant Protein Antigen (rPA) anthrax vaccine research. _____

_____ explained that even today, it was _____ belief that this objective has not really changed. _____ advised that _____ never saw any kind of substantial decrease in funding for anthrax related research. While _____ was _____ the momentum for anthrax research was constant.

_____ was not aware of any significant concerns that IVINS may have had or voiced regarding the notion that anthrax research and/or specifically rPA research was going away prior to the September 11, 2001 time frame. _____ re-iterated that IVINS's funding in the period of time preceding the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001 was stable and IVINS should not have been concerned. _____ opined that maybe IVINS had assumed that he was no longer going to be able to conduct anthrax research but _____ can not be sure of what IVINS was thinking at the time. _____ advised that "[IVINS] would often make assumptions that were not necessarily true." _____ again reiterated _____ could not be certain of what IVINS was thinking in the period of time leading up to the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001.

_____ also recalled that prior to the September 11, 2001 time frame IVINS was USAMRIID's technical representative to DUGWAY PROVING GROUNDS (DPG) pertaining to a project whereby DPG was contracted out to produce large quantities of wet *Bacillus anthracis* spores. Part of IVINS research responsibilities was to ensure or develop a standardized spore preparation system to be used in animal challenges and the DPG spores were to be used towards this goal. As an aside, _____ recalled the DPG spores

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 02/06/2008, Page 3

were "not clean" and had to be purified of their non-refractile spores, and vegetative debris.

_____ recalled that sometime around 1999 there definitely appeared to be a natural shift in anthrax research from countermeasures to therapeutics but _____ did not believe this would have had an effect on IVINS, although _____ noted at some point IVINS had one of his research proposals rejected for funding.

_____ indicated that IVINS always had some kind work to do with respect to animal experiments. At first _____ could not recall the topic of "What to do with IVINS" coming up at various _____ meetings or _____ meetings, but after some reflection, _____ indicated that _____ did have some recollection whereby the topic came up. _____ relayed that the issue of "What to do with IVINS" was not a result of anything negative but was simply an effort to maximize IVINS's skills.

_____ recalled that prior to September 11, 2001, around the 1999 time period, two entities, _____ became increasingly involved in the rPA research field. The _____ actually became the main system vendor for the anthrax vaccine as rPA research began to transition to the advanced development stage. Research work at USAMRIID became much more regimented and the review process underwent greater scrutiny as did the merit of the various research proposals. Prior to 1999 the research atmosphere at USAMRIID was more academic-like. The general attitude was "You're gonna get some money; just write something up." The need for basic anthrax research decreased but did not totally go away. _____

_____ opined that _____ is not sure whether USAMRIID researchers benefitted or not as a result of the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001. _____ feels that the anthrax mailings actually hurt USAMRIID employees in that a significant increase in research dollars became available resulting in a significant increase in competition as well. _____ stated that "All kinds of people came out of the woodwork." The entire research environment surrounding the biological defense community became more competitive. _____ named the Navy, Air Force, and the National Institute of Health as examples of new competitors.

When questioned about IVINS's late night activity in the hot suites at USAMRIID, _____ indicated that _____ was unaware that

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____

, On 02/06/2008 , Page 4

IVINS had any kind of late night hot suite activity that would be classified as unusual or excessive. [] was simply not familiar with IVINS's work hours other than to say that [] was aware that on occasion, IVINS, as well as many other researchers at USAMRIID, would have to frequent the hot suites to do work.

Continuing on the topic of BRUCE IVINS, [] advised that the hot suites were a terrible place to work. [] explained that one could not eat or drink while in the hot suite. Upon being informed of IVINS frequent late night hot suite activity around the time period preceding the anthrax-laced letter mailings in 2001, [] replied that it was "weird." [] advised that frequently researchers have to go in late at night to check on plates or animals and that this type of activity lasts normally anywhere from twenty minutes to an hour. [] confirmed that, for the most part, the work a researcher conducts in the hot suit should often be corroborated by various entries in corresponding laboratory notebooks associated with the research project the researcher is working on in the hot suite. [] reiterated that if IVINS was in the hot suite working then he would expect that IVINS's work to be documented in his (IVINS's) laboratory notebooks.

[] could not recall any notable behavior changes in IVINS during the period of time preceding the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001. [] initially described [] and IVINS as "friends"; however, later clarified that []

[] had no recollection of IVINS ever confiding in [] such matters in the period of time preceding the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001. [] reiterated that IVINS never expressed to [] that he (IVINS) was having any sort of problem outside of work that was affecting him at work. []

After some reflection, [] recalled that IVINS may have experienced

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 02/06/2008, Page 5

some depression as a result of the anthrax mailings and the subsequent scrutiny placed on USAMRIID employees. [redacted] reiterated [redacted] did not recall IVINS being in a depressed state prior to the anthrax-laced letter mailings, nor did [redacted] recall IVINS ever expressing any specific family matters with [redacted] during this period. [redacted] recalled that IVINS would often make comments about [redacted] family; however, [redacted] opined these were "tongue in cheek" comments so [redacted] was never sure how to take them.

[redacted] recalled the unauthorized environmental sampling incident which IVINS had been involved in. [redacted] was of the opinion that IVINS simply and innocently believed that some contamination had occurred as a result of USAMRIID's efforts to handle and analyze the anthrax-laced letter powder and therefor IVINS took it upon himself, as a safety precaution, to conduct environmental sampling on his own. [redacted] opined that the contamination most likely occurred as a result of some of the anthrax powder leaking out of the baggie containing the anthrax-laced letters, subsequently transferring virulent anthrax powder to the outside of the baggie.

[redacted] continued that the [redacted] [redacted] initially handled the anthrax-powders and that subsequently the letters were placed in a baggie and IVINS took the letter from [redacted] and placed it into the B3 pass-box. [redacted] was specifically queried as to how did [redacted] know that it was IVINS that took the letters from [redacted] to the B3 hot suite, to which [redacted] replied, "That's what Bruce told me." [redacted] opined that virulent anthrax was on the outside of the baggie and IVINS, who had a bad back, likely supported himself outside the B3 pass-box with one hand on the wall above the pass-box as [redacted] placed the contaminated baggie into the pass-box. [redacted] further opined that one sample above the pass-box was very hot and this confirmed [redacted] theory.

[redacted] advised that if [redacted] had told IVINS not to conduct any sampling, [redacted] was unaware of such instructions. [redacted] continued that when IVINS [redacted]

[redacted] indicated that the [redacted] did not identify the source of the contaminations as being [redacted] [redacted] had ordered a "decon" of the [redacted] work space, therefor when the sampling was done, no growth was observed.

[redacted] affirmed that IVINS's swabbing efforts did not identify the source of the contamination; however IVINS was sufficiently thorough enough to indicate that it was [redacted] and that.

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 02/06/2008, Page 6

_____ recalled that only a few spores were found in IVINS's office and opined IVINS swabbed his office perhaps because _____

_____ recalled that after IVINS initially told _____ about the growths _____ told IVINS to go back and confirm that it was virulent anthrax. IVINS reported back that they were in fact virulent, _____

_____ had no recollection of what was done with the plates IVINS had collected containing his swabbing efforts.

_____ was asked to explain, if possible, the chain of command that existed in the _____ Division while _____

_____ was unable to identify anyone specific who would have fallen under the category as IVINS supervisor. _____ reiterated that there should be documentation available which would identify who IVINS's raters were.

In an attempt to further spark _____ recollection of events within the _____ Division prior to the anthrax-laced letter mailings, _____ was shown some old USAMRIID e-mails which IVINS had authored. The first e-mail, circa April 2001, was a response from IVINS to _____ regarding _____

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b7CContinuation of FD-302 of _____, On 02/06/2008, Page 7

The next series of e-mails were dated ~~August 28~~ and August 30, 2001, from Ivins to _____. The e-mails pertain to IVINS's response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request by _____ to which IVINS's response was to _____. _____ opined that IVINS's response was consistent and not out of character for IVINS. _____ advised that prior to being shown the e-mail, _____ did not recall the _____ FOIA request.

_____ re-iterated that IVINS's funding in the period of time preceding the anthrax-laced letter mailings was stable and IVINS should not have been concerned.

(WFO NOTE: The above mentioned e-mails shown to _____ are enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication.)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Confidential Human Source (CHS) Reporting Document

Reporting Date: 04/21/2008

Case ID: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) - 1795
[REDACTED]b2
b7D

Contact Date: 04/17/2008

Type of Contact: In person

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Location: Frederick, Maryland

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b7C

Written by: SA [REDACTED]

Other(s) Present: SA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Source Reporting:

Confidential Human Source (CHS), who is **NOT** in a position to testify, provided the following information:

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After a FOX News internet news story entitled "FBI Focusing on 'About Four' Suspects in 2001 Anthrax Attacks" was posted on 03/28/2008, several employees of the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) began to discuss the article and the ongoing AMERITHRAX investigation. CHS advised that, after reading the article, many USAMRIID employees came to the conclusion that [REDACTED] a scientist formerly employed at USAMRIID, was one of the unnamed individuals discussed in the article.

[REDACTED]

CHS further reported that USAMRIID employees have also been discussing the search of BRUCE IVINS' home during the fall of 2007. CHS advised that there has been discussion of how the FBI searched IVINS' home and paid for him, and his family, to stay in a hotel. It has been said that IVINS was not allowed to return to his house for two days.

[REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

Date of transcription 05/05/2008

On April 22, 2008, [redacted] Social Security
Account Number (SSAN): [redacted] Date of Birth (DOB) [redacted]

was interviewed at his residence. After being advised of the
identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information:

(It should be noted that present [redacted] during the
duration of the interview was [redacted], Date of Birth (DOB):

[redacted] Social Security Account Number (SSAN): [redacted]
[redacted] advised that [redacted]
[redacted] because of [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] confirmed that he has been residing at his
[redacted] since [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] confirmed that he knows [redacted] BRUCE
IVINS. He indicated that BRUCE [redacted] live [redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 04/22/2008 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1796 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]
PI [redacted]

FILENAME: [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/RYS

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b7C

Date of transcription 05/06/2008

On April 11, 2008, former United States Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) [redacted]
[redacted] Social Security Account Number (SSAN) [redacted]
Date of Birth (DOB) [redacted] Telephone Number [redacted]

[redacted] was
interviewed at [redacted] place of employment as pre-arranged. After being
advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

(WFO NOTE: enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this
communication is a Non-disclosure Agreement Form [redacted]
voluntarily read and signed.)

[redacted] confirmed that while employed at Fort Detrick
was [redacted]

[redacted] was asked to
comment as to [redacted] understanding of the current status of the
anthrax investigation. [redacted] indicated that it was [redacted]
understanding that the investigation to date continues to focus on
the belief that the anthrax-laced letter mailings and/or the mailer
is associated with USAMRIID. [redacted] indicated to the interviewing
agents that [redacted] did not desire to have an over view of the entire
investigation but that [redacted] stance over the years, regardless of
what [redacted] has read in the newspapers or heard via the rumor mill,
has not changed in that [redacted] does not believe that anyone at USAMRIID
was involved in the anthrax-laced letter mailings.

[redacted] reiterated on several occasions throughout the
interview that based on [redacted] understanding and based on [redacted] having
observed the quantity of dry *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) powder
recovered from the anthrax-laced letters it was not feasible to
believe that anyone at USAMRIID could have made dry Ba powder of
that quantity and quality without being detected by other USAMRIID
employees [redacted] confirmed that [redacted] was aware that certain
researchers in [redacted] specifically [redacted]
dried/lyophylized small amounts of reagents as a necessary function
of their research but emphasized that the amounts were small and

Investigation on 04/11/2008 at [redacted]File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIIDDate dictated N/Aby SA [redacted]
PI [redacted]

FILE NAME: [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 04/11/2008, Page 2

not even remotely similar in quantity as the that of the anthrax-laced letter powders. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

and BRUCE IVINS worked together and were trying to figure out ways to better purify Ba preps for the challenges. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did in fact dry/lyophilize very small amounts of Ba but nothing remotely close to the quantity of Ba powder recovered from the anthrax-laced letter mailings. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that USAMRIID researcher, [REDACTED] also may provide further insight as to the characteristics of the [REDACTED] powders. [REDACTED] recalled [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] opined that whoever is responsible for the anthrax-laced letter mailings would have required significant amounts of time and privacy which was not in abundance at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] expounded that the perpetrator would have needed significant privacy and time in order to have produced numerous batches of spore preparations as well as having to conduct a series

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 04/11/2008, Page 3

of experiments in order to optimize the Ba powder in the same consistency as the recovered Ba evidence. When asked to provide an opinion as to whom at USAMRIID had the greatest capability to purify wet spores, [] responded that [] BRUCE IVINS were the most capable. [] reiterated again that [] did not think it was possible for an employee at USAMRIID to have produced the anthrax powder, mainly because laboratory space was extremely crowded and therefore it would be impossible for the perpetrator to maintain anonymity while producing such a large volume of purified Ba spores. [] described IVINS as just an "odd duck," someone who is very benign.

[] approximated the [] budget in 1995 to be in the area of 1.5 million dollars and that by 2002 the budget had risen to approximately 8 million dollars. [] intimated that funding was always a constant issue at USAMRIID and implied that there was nothing abnormal about that. By 2002, [] explained that USAMRIID's customer base had grown significantly to include research requests from entities such as; Department of Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and various other law enforcement entities. [] specifically recalled providing support back in the 1999 time frame to the Federal Bureau of Investigation pertaining to the high volume of hoax and mock biological terrorist attacks. [] recalled this time period as providing an excellent opportunity to prepare for a terrorist attack.

[] described the 1995 time frame at USAMRIID as being "tough years" as [] recalled the closing of the annex laboratory on base that resulted in many USAMRIID Divisions having to consolidate resources. [] specifically recalled a time period in the late 1990's and early 2000 that the Bacteriology Division's vaccine developmental programs were under funded primarily due to the anticipation that both the anthrax and plague vaccine products were transitioning over to the advanced development stage. The recombinant Protective Antigen (rPA) anthrax vaccine had transitioned over to the Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program (JVAP). [] could not recall any specific instances of an outwardly display of frustration on the part of Bacteriology Division employees; however, [] characterized Bacteriology Division employee frustration and discontentment as simply "hallway talk" around the water coolers. [] recalled some frustration exhibited by [] in part due to some resentment and frustration shared by Bacteriology Division researchers due to the increased amount of effort having to expend

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b7cContinuation of FD-302 of _____, On 04/11/2008, Page 4

on environmental sampling issues as opposed to what they really wanted to do, which was basic scientific research.

_____ continued to reflect back upon _____ tenure as _____ at USAMRIID between _____ and intimated that _____ worked hard to _____

_____ advised that _____ has not received any inquiries from past or current FBI employees pertaining to the anthrax investigation.

_____ was given an opportunity to briefly browse through _____ page report hereafter identified as _____. The anonymous report, dated July 21, 2001, is an effort by an individual or group of individuals to cast suspicion on _____ as being responsible not only for the 2001 anthrax-laced letter attacks but also cast suspicion on _____ for the _____. Upon scanning through the report _____ made the following observations.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s).

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 16
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Page 14 ~ b7D
Page 53 ~ b2, b6, b7C, b7E
Page 56 ~ b2, b7E
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